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Wednesday, March 10, 2004

Indiana Decisions - Four Supreme Court, Three Appeals Court, and one Tax Court Opinions Posted Today

Jesse E. Robinson v. State of Indiana (3/10/04 IndSCt) [Criminal Law & Procedure]
Dickson, Justice

We hold that a motion to correct sentence is available only to correct sentencing errors clear from the face of the judgment; that such motion is not equivalent to a petition for post-conviction relief and may be filed at any time; that a trial court's sentencing judgment must report not only the number of days confined while imprisoned before sentence but also must separately designate the credit time earned for the said period of confinement; that such trial court determination is subject to modification by the Department of Corrections pursuant to statute; that judgments reporting pre-sentence confinement time but omitting credit time will be presumed to designate credit time days equal to days of pre-sentence confinement; and that a motion to correct sentence is not available to challenge entries or omissions in an abstract of judgment. We affirm the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to correct sentence.
Alphonso Washington v. State of Indiana (3/10/04 IndSCt) [Criminal Law & Procedure]
Dickson, Justice
As we hold today in Robinson v. State, ___ N.E.2d ___ (Ind. 2004), a motion to correct sentence pursuant to Indiana Code § 35-38-1-1 asserting a claim that is susceptible to determination from the face of the sentencing judgment is not in the nature of a post-conviction proceeding and is not subject to the requirement for prior authorization in P-C R. 1(2). Id. at ___ (slip opin. at 5). The defendant's appeal is not subject to dismissal on this grounds.
Samuel I. Crow v. State of Indiana (3/10/04 IndSCt) [Criminal Law & Procedure]
Dickson, Justice
The State argues that the trial court does not have jurisdiction to grant credit time for time spent in pre-sentence confinement. We reject this argument today in Robinson, noting that the trial court has a statutory obligation to include this determination in its sentencing judgment, but acknowledging that the Department of Correction may thereafter modify such pre-sentence credit time determination. Id. at ___ (slip opin. at 11). We reverse the judgment of the trial court denying the defendant's motion to correct sentence and remand for correction in accordance with this opinion.
Floyd F. Laycock v. State of Indiana, Teodoro V. Garcia v. State of Indiana and James F. Glass, Sr. v. State of Indiana (3/10/04 IndSCt) [Criminal Law & Procedure]
Dickson, Justice
Each of these appeals is grounded upon the claim that the trial court's entries on the Department of Correction's abstract of judgment form violated Indiana Code § 35-38-3-2(a) which requires the sentencing judgment to include the time spent in pre-sentence confinement and also the amount of credit time earned for said confinement. Each defendant's appeal complains only of this omission in the abstract of judgment and does not allege any omission in the trial court's sentencing judgment. Entries in the abstract of judgment may not be challenged by a motion to correct sentence. Robinson v. State, ___ N.E.2d at ___ (slip opinion at 14-15). For this reason, the trial courts did not err in rejecting the motion to correct sentence filed by each of these defendants. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in each case.

Ronald W. Frazier v. James A. Mellowitz (3/10/04 IndCtApp) [Contracts]

Donna Poppe v. James Jabaay, et al. (3/10/04 IndCtApp) [Family Law]
Riley, Judge

Per the opinion: "Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by accepting Cecilia’s offer to purchase and refinance the marital residence thereby rescinding the Contract to Purchase Real Estate entered into by the court appointed commissioner and Poppe. We further find that the trial court abused its discretion by limiting Poppe’s damages to attorney’s fees and costs, instead of awarding her specific performance. Reversed and remanded with instructions."

Hyundai Motor America, Inc. v. Sandra Goodin (3/10/04 IndCtApp) [Contracts]

Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Company, et al. v. Indiana Department of State Revenue (3/9/04 IndTaxCt) [Supp. Net Income Tax]
Fisher, J.

Per the opinion:

The issue for the Court to decide is whether, for purposes of calculating Indiana supplemental net income tax liability, the Petitioners’ sales of natural gas to out-of-state purchasers should be excluded from the formula for computing the fraction of their business income to be allocated to Indiana. * * *

This Court cannot say that the Petitioners’ sales at issue meet the requirements of Indiana Administrative Code title 45, rule 3.1-1-53(6). As such, Petitioners’ sales at issue are not allocable to Indiana, and are therefore not required to be included in the numerator of the formula for computing the Petitioners’ supplemental net income tax liability.*

Conclusion. For the foregoing reasons, the Department’s final determination is REVERSED.

*The Petitioners raised one other argument: if this Court were to determine that the sales at issue were to be included in the numerator of the formula, then it must determine whether Indiana Administrative Code title 45, rule 3.1-1-53(6) is invalid because it exceeds the scope of its enabling statute as well as violates the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. Given the Court’s decision that the subject sales are not required to be included in the formula, those questions are now moot. See Bremen Pub. Schools v. Varab, 496 N.E.2d 125, 127 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (stating that issues become moot when they are no longer live or when the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome of their resolution); Ind. Wholesale Wine & Liquor Co., Inc. v. State of Indiana ex rel. Ind. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 695 N.E.2d 99, 108 (Ind. 1998) (stating if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, and the other a question of statutory (or regulatory) construction, court will decide only the latter).

Posted by Marcia Oddi on March 10, 2004 02:59 PM
Posted to Indiana Decisions