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Tuesday, March 23, 2004

Indiana Decisions - A number of Court of Appeals decisions today; several are high visibility

Keith R. Michael, et al. v. City of Bloomington, et al. (3/22/04 IndCtApp) [Eminent Domain]

Eugene King v. Tom Terry (3/22/04 IndCtApp) [Quantum Meruit, Real Estate]

Shahid Iqbal v. State of Indiana (3/22/04 IndCtApp) [Criminal Law & Procedure]

Sam Matshazi v. State of Indiana (3/22/04 IndCtApp) [Criminal Law & Procedure]

Robin Montgomery v. State of Indiana (3/22/04 IndCtApp) [Criminal Law & Procedure]
Bailey, Judge

Montgomery raises eight issues, one of which we find dispositive: whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance. In order to determine whether retrial is permissible, we also examine the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Montgomery’s convictions. Finally, we address whether Montgomery’s convictions for the two arson counts violate principles of double jeopardy. * * * Reversed and remanded.
Westfield Companies v. Ralph Knapp, et al. (3/23/04 IndCtApp) [Insurance]

Bielfeldt et al v. Nims (3/23/04 IndCtApp) [Arbitration]

Arvel Ray Collins v. Tara Lea Collins (3/23/04 IndCtApp) [Family Law]

Maurice K. Smith v. State of Indiana (3/23/04 IndCtApp) [Criminal Law & Procedure; Constitutional Law]
Brook, Senior Judge

Here the Court considers "Whether Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-14 violates Article I, Section 19 of the Indiana Constitution."

We therefore conclude that the right to have a jury determine the facts and the law regarding a defendant’s repeat sexual offender status exists by virtue of Article I, Section 19 of the Indiana Constitution. See footnote Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-14 is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to Smith in this case. Consequently, we vacate Smith’s repeat sexual offender adjudication and sentence enhancement.*

*Citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), Smith also contends that Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-14 violates the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution because it “forces a judge to determine facts besides just that of repeat offender status when weighing what sentence a person should receive.” Because we have already concluded that the statute violates the Indiana Constitution, we need not resolve that question here. We presume that the legislature will follow applicable federal law should it decide to enact another version of the repeat sexual offender statute.

[Update 3/24/04] This write-up of the ruling was published today in the NWI Times.

In The Matter of K.S.P and J.P. (3/23/04 IndCtApp) [Family Law]
Friedlander, Judge

Monica J. Polchert appeals the denial of her uncontested petition to adopt K.S.P. and J.P., the biological children of her domestic partner, Linda L. Lutz. She presents the following consolidated and restated issue for review: Did the trial court err in denying her petition to adopt the children as a second parent? We reverse and remand.
In the course of the opinion, the Court quotes from a Vermont Supreme Court decision:
When social mores change, governing statutes must be interpreted to allow for those changes in a manner that does not frustrate the purposes behind their enactment. To deny the children of same-sex partners, as a class, the security of a legally recognized relationship with their second parent serves no legitimate state interest. By allowing same-sex adoptions to come within the step-parent exception of § 448, we are furthering the purposes of the statute as was originally intended by allowing the children of such unions the benefits and security of a legal relationship with their de facto second parents.

As the case law from other jurisdictions illustrates, our paramount concern should be with the effect of our laws on the reality of children’s lives. It is not the courts that have engendered the diverse composition of today’s families. It is the advancement of reproductive technologies and society’s recognition of alternative lifestyles that have produced families in which a biological, and therefore a legal, connection is no longer the sole organizing principle. But it is the courts that are required to define, declare and protect the rights of children raised in these families, usually upon their dissolution. At that point, courts are left to vindicate the public interest in the children’s financial support and emotional well-being by developing theories of parenthood, so that “legal strangers” who are de facto parents may be awarded custody or visitation or reached for support. Case law and commentary on the subject detail the years of litigation spent in settling these difficult issues while the children remain in limbo, sometimes denied the affection of a “parent” who has been with them from birth. It is surely in the best interests of children, and the state, to facilitate adoptions in these circumstances so that legal rights and responsibilities may be determined now and any problems that arise later may be resolved within the recognized framework of domestic relations laws.

We are not called upon to approve or disapprove of the relationship between the appellants. Whether we do or not, the fact remains that Deborah has acted as a parent of [the children] from the moment they were born. To deny legal protection of their relationship, as a matter of law, is inconsistent with the children’s best interests and therefore with the public policy of this state, as expressed in our statutes affecting children.

and concludes: "We fully endorse this rationale."
Our recent decision in Adoption of M.M.G.C. [3/18/03] recognizes some of the many benefits of a second-parent adoption and concludes, “[a]llowing a second parent to share legal responsibility for the financial, spiritual, educational, and emotional well-being of the child in a stable, supportive, and nurturing environment can only be in the best interest of that child.” Adoption of M.M.G.C., 785 N.E.2d at 270-71. Entitlement to these benefits from a second parent cannot rationally hinge on whether the child’s natural parent is a biological or adoptive parent.

We conclude that where, as here, the prospective adoptive parent and the biological parent are both in fact acting as parents, Indiana law does not require a destructive choice between the two parents. Allowing continuation of the rights of both the biological and adoptive parent, where compelled by the best interests of the child, is the only rational result. We, therefore, reverse the trial court’s denial of Polchert’s petition to adopt as a second parent and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

[Update 3/24/04] This brief note appeared today in the Indianapolis Star.

Stephen Faust v. State of Indiana (3/23/04 IndCtApp) [Criminal Law & Procedure]

Estate of Robert "Bobby" Lee Helms (3/23/04 IndCtApp) [Estates & Trusts]
Friedlander, Judge

Robert “Bobby” Helms (Bobby) was a recording artist most noted for three hit songs that topped the pop and country music charts in the late 1950s. Those songs were Fraulein, My Special Angel, and Jingle Bell Rock. Bobby died in Morgan County, Indiana on June 19, 1997. After his death, the royalties to those songs comprised a significant part of his estate. Several probate actions ensued involving either directly or indirectly the rights to those royalties. This appeal challenges a ruling in one of those actions. Appellants consist of Bobby’s estate (the Estate) and two of his children, Robert Helms II (Robert) and Angel Faith Helms McCartney (Angel). The appellee is another of Bobby’s children, Tyeanne Helms-Hawkins (Tyeanne). The ruling at issue is the granting of Tyeanne’s motion to set aside an Agreed Judgment that purportedly settled a dispute over royalties between the Estate on one side and Robert and Angel on the other. Appellants contend that the trial court erred in setting aside the Agreed Judgment, presenting the following consolidated, restated issues for review: 1. Did Tyeanne have standing to challenge the Agreed Judgment? 2. Did the trial court err in granting Tyeanne’s motion to set aside the Agreed Judgment? We affirm.

Posted by Marcia Oddi on March 23, 2004 02:49 PM
Posted to Indiana Decisions