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Thursday, May 20, 2004

Indiana Decisions - Four Supreme Court Decisions Posted Today

Jeffrey Dean Washington v. State of Indiana (5/20/04 IndSCt) [Criminal Law & Procedure]
Rucker, Justice - Affirmed.

In the Matter of K.G., D.G. D.C.B. and J.J.S. (5/20/04 IndSCt) [Statutory Construction; Juvenile Law]
Rucker, Justice

We hold that although juveniles alleged to be delinquent have the constitutional right to have their competency determined before they are subjected to delinquency proceedings, the adult competency statute is not applicable in reaching that determination. * * *

The State contends here, as it did before the Court of Appeals, that the trial court’s reliance on the adult competency statute was improper because the juvenile code provides procedures that permit a court to make competency determinations for children and place them in treatment centers when necessary. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, concluding (1) juveniles have a constitutional right to have their competency determined before they are subjected to delinquency proceedings, and (2) because the juvenile code provides no procedure for determining the competency of children, the adult competency statute applies. * * *

Indiana Code section 31-32-1-1 provides, “If a child is alleged to be a delinquent child, the procedures governing criminal trials apply in all matters not covered by the juvenile law.” It is true that the juvenile code does not provide an explicit procedure for handling juvenile competency issues. Nonetheless, in construing a statute our main objective is to determine, give effect to, and implement the intent of the legislature. As a matter of statutory interpretation, and considering the history and purpose underlying the juvenile code, we do not believe the Legislature intended that the adult competency statute should apply to juveniles. * * *

We conclude that juveniles alleged to be delinquent have the constitutional right to have their competency determined before they are subjected to delinquency proceedings. However, the adult competency statute is not applicable in reaching that determination. We therefore reverse the judgment of the juvenile court and remand this cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson and Boehm, JJ., concur.
Sullivan, J., not participating.

In the Matter of Termination of E.T. and B.T (5/20/04 IndSCt) [Evidence]
Rucker, Justice
We conclude that reports compiled by a social services agency describing home visits and supervised visitations do not qualify as business records and thus are not admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. * * *

Except as otherwise provided, we vacate the opinion of the Court of Appeals and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson and Boehm, JJ., concur.
Sullivan, J., not participating.

Derrick Daron Clark v. State of Indiana (5/19/04 IndSCt) [Criminal Law & Procedure]
Boehm, Justice
In this direct appeal, Derrick Clark appeals his conviction of murder and sentence to life without parole. We affirm the trial court. * * *

C. Constitutionality of Statute. * * * At the time of the original sentencing, the life without parole statute provided that, “[t]he court shall make the final determination of the sentence, after considering the jury’s recommendation . . . .” I.C. § 35-50-2-9(e) (2002). Clark argues that under the United States Supreme Court decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), the life without parole statute applicable at the time of his conviction is unconstitutional. * * * Clark asserts that even though the trial judge in this case accepted the jury’s unanimous recommendation, the fact that the statute can be applied in an unconstitutional manner renders the entire statute unconstitutional. * * * This is not a claim that the jury was incorrectly instructed as to its role, which is an error that violates the Eighth Amendment as interpreted in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 330 (1985). Rather, Clark’s contention boils down to a claim that the pre-2002 version of the Indiana Death Penalty statute was inherently defective because the jury did not consider its determination to be binding on the judge. If the jury believed its recommendation to be binding, it might “feel more solemn in its deliberations.” At the time of the jury deliberation, Indiana law provided that the recommendation was not binding, and the jury was so instructed. There was no error in the instructions, and there is no authority for the proposition that a nonbinding recommendation is inherently unconstitutional. * * *
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, and Sullivan, JJ. concur.
Rucker, J., concurs except for the majority’s resolution concerning the sentence. * * *

Posted by Marcia Oddi on May 20, 2004 02:09 PM
Posted to Indiana Decisions