« Indiana Law - Ballot Design at Issue Again | Main | Indiana Decisions - One Court of Appeals Opinion Today »
Tuesday, June 15, 2004
Indiana Decisions - Eight 7th Circuit Rulings Posted Today
HALL, KEVIN T. v. USA (SD Ill.) Before BAUER, EASTERBROOK, and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges. BAUER, writing for the panel, rules that "Hall is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine whether there was an actual conflict of interest that produced an adverse effect. We REVERSE and REMAND to the district court for that purpose. Judge EASTERBROOK dissents.
INGRAM, SONIA v. MERRILL LYNCH PIERCE (ND Ill.) Per Curiam. "Given the lack of any factual or legal support for the appellants’ arguments on appeal, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the appellants’ petition as untimely, and AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of appellants’ petition [to reopen a stipulation of settlement which was approved without objections and became effective in 1998]."
KLASSY, JIM v. PHYSICIANS PLUS INSURANCE (WD Wis.)
Manion, Circuit Judge. * * * ERISA provides a remedy for plan participants wrongfully denied benefits. However, such claims must be brought under ERISA and creatively pleading a denial of benefits claim as a state law claim does not defeat the broad preemptive force of ERISA. Thus, although the Klassys might have succeeded under ERISA and obtained payment for the bloodless surgery, because they instead opted to pursue a state law claim that is preempted, the district court properly dismissed their complaint. For these and the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.NAVARRO, MAUREEN A. v. FDIC (ND Ill.)
EVANS, Circuit Judge. Maureen Navarro worked 39 years for the Universal Federal Savings Bank, starting as a parttime clerical assistant in 1963 and eventually becoming the president and chief executive officer of the firm in 1997. In her case here she has all the equities on her side, for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) (more on its involvement later) concedes that if she would have quit—just walked off the job—on June 26, 2002, she would be entitled to receive “deferred compensation” payments she earned under two agreements she had with Universal. But because she showed up for work the next day, June 27, 2002, she’s out of luck . . . and out of the money. So says the FDIC and the district court which dismissed Navarro’s case on summary judgment. * * *RAMOS RAMOS, MIGUEL v. ASHCROFT, JOHN (Bd.Immig.App.)We understand the FDIC’s desire to conserve savings and loan assets for creditors while keeping golden parachute money from unscrupulous executives who have run an institution into the ground to their own benefit. That is not, however, what happened here. These were modest agreements drawn up two decades before the institution defaulted, and Navarro’s rights in them, we hold, were vested. To say she could have unquestionably received the benefits if she quit—or was fired for cause—on June 26 but that she cannot recover because she came to work on June 27 defies logic and common sense. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. What is the location of a proceeding conducted in two places at once? Immigration officials, who propose to remove Miguel Angel Ramos from the United States, offered him a hearing in Council Bluffs, Iowa. There Ramos, his lawyer, his witnesses, and the lawyer for the government testified and argued in front of a television set, connected by teleconference equipment to the chambers of an immigration judge in Chicago, Illinois. At the end of a hearing the immigration judge read a decision into the record; a formal order bore the caption: ... Chicago, Illinois. [The issue is which circuit, the 8th or 7th, should hear the appeal of the Board's dismissal of Ramos' appeal. DOJ wants to transfer to the 8th] Teleconferencing is increasingly common, so we were surprised to discover that no court has addressed the question where a proceeding is “completed” for purposes of §1252(b)(2). * * * [T]he statute itself ensures that the alien may petition for review in the circuit where the immigration court is located. So the motion to transfer is denied.SCA TISSUE NORTH v. NLRB (NLRB)One further comment is in order. The Department of Justice filed its motion on April 22, 2004, the day its brief was due. Counsel asked us to grant more time to file a brief if we should deny the motion for transfer. Filing motions in lieu of briefs, a form of self-help extension, has become increasingly common but is not authorized by any rule, either national or local. It is fine to file a motion to affirm, to dismiss for want of jurisdiction, to transfer to another circuit, and so on; the problem lies in the belief that any motion automatically defers the deadline for filing the brief. A brief must be tendered when due. * * * The motion to transfer in this case should have come well before Ramos filed his own brief. * * *
The brief for the Attorney General is overdue. No extension of time has been granted. Nor should the respondent need much time to file; the brief should be written already. Unless the respondent files a brief on the merits by June 22, 2004, the matter will be submitted for decision on the petitioner’s brief alone. Fed. R. App. P. 31(c).
USA v. MACEDO, GREGORIO (ND Ill.) "An incorrect designation of the drug schedule in the indictment does not mean there is an Apprendi violation when the indictment also lists the specific drug as well as the quantity." More.
POSNER, Circuit Judge. Earnest White has applied to us pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3) for leave to file a successive motion to vacate, under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, his federal criminal judgment. * * * No reported appellate case addresses the question whether a direct appeal is a “prior application” within the meaning of section 2244(b)(1). [Judge Posner denies the application; Judge Wood dissents.]
Posted by Marcia Oddi on June 15, 2004 01:53 PM
Posted to Indiana Decisions