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Tuesday, September 21, 2004

Indiana Decisions - Supreme Court Grants Emergency Transfer

In an order issued September 13, the Indiana Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction over the case of SMDfund, Inc. et al. v. Fort Wayne-Allen County County Airport Authority, pursuant to the an infrequently granted Appellate Rule 56(A) request:

Rule 56. Requests to Transfer to the Supreme Court
A. Motion Before Consideration by the Court of Appeals. In rare cases, the Supreme Court may, upon verified motion of a party, accept jurisdiction over an appeal that would otherwise be within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals upon a showing that the appeal involves a substantial question of law of great public importance and that an emergency exists requiring a speedy determination. If the Supreme Court grants the motion, it will transfer the case to the Supreme Court, where the case shall proceed as if it had been originally filed there. If a filing fee has already been paid in the Court of Appeals, no additional filing fee is required.
[emphasis added]

A copy of Chief Justice Randall T. Shepard's 9/13/04 order may be accessed here*. A copy of the case docket, as of today, is available here. [Note: Scanned documents, may be slow to load.]

Trial Court Decision. I have been able to obtain a copy of the trial court decision of Allen County Circuit Court Judge Thomas J. Felts.*

SMDfund, Inc. et al. v. Fort Wayne-Allen County County Airport Authority (6/28/04 AllenCirCt) [Note - scanned, may be slow loading]
Judge Felts

[Issue] Whether the doctrine of the statute of limitations precludes citizens from contesting the constitutionality of a statute that provides a basis for the formation of an airport authority 17 years after the statute was enacted * * * [Note: The limitation on actions at play here is IC 34-11-1-2.]

In compliance with the 1985 amendment made by the General Assembly and under the direction of the specifications stated in the amended statute, a joint airport authority was created beween the City of Fort Wayne and Allen County. To this day, Allen County is the only county in Indiana that meets the requirements of the specific population bracket stated in the statute [IC 8-22-3-1.1]. * * *

On February 12, 2003, SMDfund, Inc., Joseph Tocci and Scoa W. Noble filed a complaint with the Allen Circuit Court. This complaint states that the Fort Wayne-Allen County Airport Authority does not possess any legal control over Smith Field and the statute creating the Authority is unconstitutional as "special legislation". * * * On October 10, 2003 the Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint seeking a declaration that [IC 8-22-3-1.1] is unconstitutional special legislation and that the Authority has no legal status pursuant to the statute. * * *

The purpose of the statute of limitations is to establish a time limit for suing in a civil case based on the date when the event causing the injury transpired.

In the Authority's motion for summary judgment, the party's reasoning for why the statute of limitations precludes Plaintiffs' claims is based upon many factors. In its motion for summary judgment, the Authority recognizes the complexity of applying the statute of limitations to an issue challenging the constitutionality of a statute. In the past, courts have differentiated between facial challenges and as applied challenges and have implemented this limitation analysis to statutes. Kuhnle Brothers v. County of Geauga (6th Cir. 1997); National Advertising C. v. City of Raleigh (4th Cir. 1991). A facial challenge is a claim that the "mere enactment" of a statute is unconstitutional. National Advertising. An as-applied challenge focuses on the effect of a statute's application to specific property and individuals. Id

Under an as-applied challenge, the statute of limitations does not commence until the unconstitutional act ceased to exist. This type of constitutional violation is often referred to as a "continuing violation". Kuhnle Bros. In a facial challenge, the statute of limitations begins to run on the date the statute was enacted. De Anza Properties (9Ih Cir. 1991). Although it is ultimately the Court's discretion to determine whether a constitutional violation is a continuing violation. Plaintiffs' complaint seems to constitute a facial challenge. ***

The Plaintiffs argue that the statute of limitations does not apply to this lawsuit because the [airport] statute should be considered special legislation therefore allowing Plaintiffs to bring a claim at anytime. The Plaintiffs base this reasoning from a case in which property owners filed a remonstrance and presented a petition in opposition to annexation by the defendant city. Municipal City of South Bend v. Kimsey. 78 1 N.E.2d 683 (Ind. 2003). In order for Plaintiffs' argument to proceed, it must be determined whether the statute creating the Authority is unconstitutional on the premise of special legislation. * * *

[U]nlike the statute being challenged in Kimsey, there is no evidence that the population category contained in [IC 8-22-3-1.1] is designed to operate upon or benefit only particular municipalities and thus may not constitute special legislation. * * *

Plaintiffs' claim was filed more than 17 years after the enactment of the challenged statute. Because the challenged statute may be considered constitutional and Plaintiffs filed a facial challenge, the general statute of limitations of ten years bars Plaintiffs from filing such a claim. In addition, Plaintiffs failed to provide evidence that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding the time limit for challenging whether a statute was unconstitutional providing grounds for the Authority's motion for summary judgment.

Some thoughts.

• First, I was struck by the fact that although this is a case in the Indiana courts, involving Indiana statutes and the Indiana constitution, the authority relied on consists of a 6th Circuit decision, a 4th Circuit decision, and a 9th Circuit decision.
  
• Second, I'm not clear whether the decision is saying: (a) that because the law at issue is not unconsitutional special legislation, the statute of limitations bars its challenge, OR (b) that plaintiff's claim is barred because the statute of limitations precludes any challenge to the consitutionality of the statute.
• Third, if upheld, would this decision mean that the General Assembly can protect its statutes from constitutional challenge by simply passing a law limiting the time for challenge (or perhaps totally prohibiting challenge)? Or does the separation of powers play a part here?

The Indiana Supreme Court's decision in City of South Bend v. Kimsey, et.al. (Ind.S.Ct. 1/15/03) may be accessed directly here. The Indiana Law Blog entry summarizing it is here. See also this entry.
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*Thanks to Edward P. Benchik, Esq. TUESLEY & HALL, LLP, for providing me with copies of these two documents.

Posted by Marcia Oddi on September 21, 2004 04:20 PM
Posted to Indiana Decisions