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Tuesday, October 19, 2004

Indiana Decisions - Two today from the Supreme Court

State of Indiana v. Kevin Starks (10/19/04 IndSCt) [Criminal Law & Procedure]
Rucker, Justice

A defendant who pleads guilty to driving while suspended as an habitual traffic violator may not later challenge the plea on grounds that the underlying offense is invalid. * * *

In essence Starks indeed may be entitled to post-conviction relief from his 2001 guilty plea of driving while suspended as an habitual traffic violator. However, it is not a sufficient basis for relief that the underlying offense has been set aside on procedural grounds. This is the precise ground on which the post-conviction court relied in setting aside Starks’ conviction and ordering the resulting license suspension expunged from Starks’ driving record. In so doing the post-conviction court erred.

Conclusion. We reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court.
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Sullivan and Boehm, JJ., concur.

Phillip Lee v. State of Indiana (10/19/04 IndSCt) [Criminal Law & Procedure]
Rucker, Justice
The question presented is whether an illegal sentence imposed pursuant to a plea agreement automatically renders the entire agreement void. We conclude it does not.

Facts and Procedural History. In 1988, the State charged Phillip Lee with robbery as a Class C felony and also alleged that he was an habitual offender. Under the terms of a written plea agreement Lee pleaded guilty to the robbery charge in exchange for the State’s dismissal of the habitual offender allegation. Also under the terms of the agreement, the trial court sentenced Lee to a term of eight years imprisonment, to run consecutively to a three-year sentence Lee was serving for an unrelated theft conviction. Lee eventually served both sentences and was discharged.

In 1996, Lee was charged with dealing in cocaine as a Class A felony. He was also alleged to be an habitual offender based on the prior theft and robbery convictions. After a trial by jury Lee was found guilty as charged and was found to be an habitual offender. The trial court sentenced Lee to fifty years for the dealing conviction enhanced by thirty years for the habitual offender adjudication. Lee’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. See Lee v. State, 694 N.E.2d 719 (Ind. 1998).

Presently serving an eighty-year sentence, and in an effort to have his habitual offender adjudication set aside, Lee filed a petition for post-conviction relief challenging his prior robbery conviction. After a hearing the post-conviction court denied relief. On review the Court of Appeals reversed. See Lee v. State, 792 N.E.2d 603 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). Having previously granted transfer we now affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. * * *

Discussion. In general a trial court cannot order consecutive sentences in the absence of express statutory authority. At the time Lee committed the offense the statute governing consecutive sentences was limited to those occasions where the court was meting out two or more terms of imprisonment contemporaneously. See Kendrick v. State, 529 N.E.2d 1311, 1312 (Ind. 1988), superseded by statute. In this case Lee’s sentences for robbery and theft were not being imposed contemporaneously. As a result the trial court lacked statutory authority to order the sentences to be served consecutively. According to Lee, “an illegal sentencing provision voids the entire plea agreement and requires vacation of the conviction and sentence entered under the agreement.” In support Lee cites Sinn v. State, 609 N.E.2d 434 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) and Thompson v. State, 634 N.E.2d 775 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). * * *

Our courts have long held that plea agreements are in the nature of contracts entered into between the defendant and the State. [cites omitted] As this Court has explained:

[A] plea agreement is contractual in nature, binding the defendant, the state and the trial court. The prosecutor and the defendant are the contracting parties, and the trial court’s role with respect to their agreement is described by statute: If the court accepts a plea agreement, it shall be bound by its terms.
* * *

The record shows that the evidence against Lee on the charge of robbery was overwhelming. By agreeing to plead guilty to the charge in exchange for the State dismissing an habitual offender allegation, Lee reduced his penal exposure by thirty years. See [IC] 35-50-2-8(e). Lee does not contend that he would have taken his chances and gone to trial had he known that the trial court lacked the statutory authority to run his eight-year sentence for robbery consecutive to his three-year sentence in the unrelated theft conviction, for a total of eleven years.

Under some circumstances, the appropriate remedy to address an illegal sentence like the one here is to sever the illegal sentencing provision from the plea agreement, and remand the cause to the trial court with instructions to enter an order running the sentences concurrently. However Lee is entitled to no such relief. A defendant “may not enter a plea agreement calling for an illegal sentence, benefit from that sentence, and then later complain that it was an illegal sentence.” Collins v. State, 509 N.E.2d 827, 833 (Ind. 1987). As this Court has more recently explained:

“[D]efendants who plead guilty to achieve favorable outcomes give up a plethora of substantive claims and procedural rights, such as challenges to convictions that would otherwise constitute double jeopardy. Striking a favorable bargain including a consecutive sentence the court might otherwise not have the ability to impose falls within this category.”
Davis v. State, 771 N.E.2d 647, 649 n.4 (Ind. 2002) (citation and quotation omitted).

Conclusion. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Sullivan and Boehm, JJ., concur.

Posted by Marcia Oddi on October 19, 2004 02:04 PM
Posted to Indiana Decisions