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Wednesday, December 08, 2004

Indiana Decisions - Court of Appeals posts two today

Metropolitan School District of Lawrence Township v. M.S. (12/8/04 IndctApp) [ ]
Sharpnack, Judge

Metropolitan School District of Lawrence Township (“School”) appeals from the trial court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment and the grant of a cross-motion for summary judgment filed on behalf of M.S. by her parents, Cynthia Stancliffe and Thomas Stancliffe (collectively, “the Parents”). The School raises one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court erred by finding that the Parents were the “prevailing party” in due process hearing relating to M.S.’s special education needs under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. We reverse and remand.
LaMar Williams v. State of Indiana (12/8/04 IndCyApp) [Criminal Law & Procedure]
Robb, Judge
* * * Waiver. We note at the outset that the State asserts that Williams has waived this issue on appeal because he failed to raise an objection at the time of sentencing. We disagree. The trial court sentenced Williams on January 15, 2004. The United States Supreme Court did not decide Blakely until June 24, 2004. Therefore, Williams could not raise an objection under Blakely at the time of his sentencing. * * *

Without expressing any opinion on the retroactivity of Blakely, it was reasonable for Williams to believe at the time of his sentencing that, because he was sentenced within the sentencing range for a Class D felony provided by our legislature, his sentence did not violate Apprendi, considering our decision in Parker. Thus, Williams has not waived this issue. * * *

A single aggravating circumstance can justify the imposition of an enhanced sentence. Powell v. State, 769 N.E.2d 1128, 1135 (Ind. 2002). Therefore, we need not address whether the trial court’s finding of other aggravating circumstances was improper under Blakely because Williams’ prior criminal history, standing alone, was sufficient to enhance his sentence. * * * Under Apprendi/Blakely, only a prior conviction may be used to enhance a defendant’s sentence without a finding of additional facts by a jury. Williams had two prior convictions: a 1994 juvenile adjudication for burglary, a Class C felony if committed by an adult; and a 1997 conviction for possession of cocaine as a Class D felony. Thus, Williams’ criminal history alone was sufficient to support the trial court’s imposition of the maximum sentence.

Conclusion. The State did not violate Williams’ constitutional rights under Batson when it used a peremptory challenge to remove an African-American from the jury pool. Furthermore, the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain Williams’ convictions. Finally, the trial court did not err in enhancing Williams’ sentence for his Class D felony conviction. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. Affirmed.
KIRSCH, C.J., concurs.

BAKER, J., concurs in result with opinion.
I agree with the result reached in this case, but I part ways with the view espoused by the majority that Williams did not waive the Blakely issue.

Here, at no time before the trial court did Williams raise any objection—either specifically under Apprendi or generally under the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury—to the court’s finding of aggravating circumstances or imposition of an enhanced sentence. Thus, I believe that the issue has been waived. See Mitchell v. State, 730 N.E.2d 197, 201 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that when a defendant does not properly bring an objection to the trial court’s attention so that the trial court may rule upon it at the appropriate time, he is deemed to have waived that possible error).

The United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Apprendi, upon which the defendant in Blakely objected to his “exceptional” sentence, well before Williams’s sentencing hearing in January 2004. In my view, that the Apprendi rule was extended in Blakely is of no moment, inasmuch as Williams should have objected on Apprendi grounds and preserved this issue, just as the defendant in Blakely did.

That said, while my colleagues in this case go on to decide that Williams’s sentence was proper in light of his prior criminal history—waiver issue aside—I concur with the decision to affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Posted by Marcia Oddi on December 8, 2004 02:56 PM
Posted to Indiana Decisions