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Wednesday, December 15, 2004

Indiana Decisions - Court of Appeals posts three today

Jimmie L. Woodley, Allstate Insurance v. Ted & Rosella Fields (12/15/04 IndCtApp) [Insurance]
Sharpnack, Judge

Allstate Insurance Company (“Allstate”) appeals the trial court’s orders: (1) denying Allstate’s motion for relief from default judgment; (2) denying Allstate’s motion for partial summary judgment; (3) denying Allstate’s motion to enforce a settlement agreement; and (4) granting Ted Fields (“Fields”) and Rosella Fields’s (collectively, “the Fieldses”) motion in limine. We find the following two issues dispositive to the resolution of this case:
Whether we have jurisdiction over the trial court’s interlocutory orders: (1) denying Allstate’s motion for partial summary judgment; (2) denying Allstate’s motion to enforce a settlement agreement; and (3) granting the Fieldses’ motion in limine; and
Whether the trial court erred by denying Allstate’s motion for partial summary judgment on the Fieldses’ bad faith claim against Allstate. See footnote
We reverse and remand. * * *
DARDEN, J. concurs
ROBB, J. concurs with separate opinion
I concur, but write separately to note my concern regarding Allstate’s behavior once the Fieldses amended their complaint to add a bad faith claim against Allstate in March 1997. It seems clear to me that Allstate engaged in a pattern of evasion and delay once it was added as a party defendant. I acknowledge that Allstate’s post-litigation behavior cannot be a basis for a bad faith claim already filed. See slip op. at 20-21. However, I simply note that the result herein is driven by the Fieldses’ bad timing in filing their bad faith claim. All other things being equal, the result herein could have been significantly different for Allstate.
Jessie Payton, et al v. Melvin Moore, et al (12/15/04 IndCtApp) [Real Estate]
Najam, Judge
Roger E. Harvey sold the same parcel of property first to James Payton and then to Clarence Hadley and Melvin Moore (“the Subsequent Purchasers”). Both deeds were recorded on different dates in 2000. Thereafter, the Subsequent Purchasers filed, in part, a quiet title and declaratory judgment action and moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the summary judgment motion declaring that Payton’s deed for the parcel in question was void and quieted title in the Subsequent Purchasers. Payton and his wife Jessie (collectively “the Paytons”) now appeal, and we address the following dispositive issue: whether the trial court erred as a matter of law when it concluded that Payton’s deed to the disputed parcel was void ab initio. We reverse and remand. * * *

We conclude that the trial court erred as matter of law when it entered summary judgment in favor of the Subsequent Purchasers on Counts I and II of their complaint. Regarding Count II, the Subsequent Purchasers are not entitled to a declaratory judgment that the Commissioner’s Deed was void ab initio. And because the Commissioner’s Deed is not void as a matter of law, we (1) reverse and remand with instructions to the trial court to enter summary judgment in the Paytons’ favor on Count II; (2) reverse the trial court’s entry of summary judgment on Count I quieting title to the parking lot parcel in favor of the Subsequent Purchasers; and (3) remand for further proceedings on Counts I, III, IV, and V of the Subsequent Purchasers’ complaint and the Paytons’ third party complaint. Reversed and remanded with instructions.
SULLIVAN, J., and BARNES, J., concur.

J.B. v. State of Indiana (12/15/04 IndCtApp) [Juvenile Law; Statutory Construction]
May, Judge
J.B. appeals the trial court’s order that he register as a sex offender. He questions whether the trial court erred when it determined he met the definition of “offender” as set forth in Ind. Code § 5-2-12-4(b). We affirm. * * *

Specifically, J.B. claims the trial court erred when it found he was an “offender.” Ind. Code § 5-2-12-4(b) defines when a child may be ordered to register as a sex offender: * * *

J.B. acknowledges he is over fourteen years old, and he does not question the court’s finding he was likely to commit another of the crimes enumerated in subsection (a). However, he argues “he cannot be an ‘offender’ because he was neither on probation or parole, nor had he been discharged from the DOC.” J.B. alleges he was removed from probation in October of 2003 when the court placed him on home detention with his grandparents and he “was never actually in detention in any secured facility,” because the DOC would not accept him. We disagree. * * *

Rather, we see such facts as an indication he had been placed in the DOC by the court and then released by the DOC. Being discharged from the DOC is an event that gives the trial court authority to require J.B. to register as a sex offender. See Ind. Code § 5-2-12-4(b). * * *
Affirmed.
SHARPNACK, J., and BAILEY, J., concur.

Posted by Marcia Oddi on December 15, 2004 05:12 PM
Posted to Indiana Decisions