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Friday, January 20, 2006
Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals decides two today
Alfred G. Nelson v. State of Indiana is an interesting 6-page case involving a charge of failure to stop at an accident resulting in death. Judge Friedlander writes:
Both parties agree that this appeal revolves round a single question: Do the duties of a motorist, as set out in I.C. § 9-26-1-1, arise in an incident in which his or her vehicle did not make physical contact with another vehicle or person? The parties further agree that the resolution of that question involves two Indiana cases. We will begin our analysis there. * * *Note footnote 3 of the opinion: "The State petitioned for transfer following our decision reversing Armstrong’s conviction. Our Supreme heard oral argument on the State’s petition on April 14, 2005. As of the date of this decision, however, the Supreme Court had not yet ruled on the petition to transfer. Unless and until the Supreme Court’s grants the transfer petition, Armstrong remains good law. Ind. Appellate Rule 58."We believe Armstrong was correct in interpreting I.C. § 9-26-1-1 such that the duties set out therein are triggered regardless of whether the driver’s vehicle struck anyone or anything, so long as the driver’s vehicle was involved in an accident. Thus, we also decline to follow Honeycutt. This does not end the matter, however. Nelson contends that even if we reject Honeycutt and decide that Armstrong represents the correct interpretation of I.C. § 9-26-1-1, that rule represents a change in the law that should not apply to him. We agree. Armstrong addressed the same question, as reflected in the following:
In declining to follow Honeycutt, we acknowledge that our interpretation is so markedly different as to cause concerns about retroactive application to Armstrong. Constitutional provisions against ex post facto laws apply only to enactments by legislative bodies. … However, this court has recognized that the principle underlying the prohibition of ex post facto laws “may limit the retroactive application of judicial decisions interpreting statutes.” * * *The principle announced in Armstrong concerning the necessity of physical contact between the defendant’s vehicle and another person or thing, constituted a significant change in the interpretation of I.C. § 9-26-1-1. We see no meaningful distinction between this case and Armstrong with respect to the issue of retroactive application. Accordingly, the Honeycutt interpretation of I.C. § 9-26-1-1 must be applied to Nelson’s actions in this case. Under those circumstances, the trial court should have granted Nelson’s motion to dismiss under Honeycutt. [i.e. there was no physical contact] Judgment reversed.
For more on the Armstrong decision, see this ILB entry from March 2, 2005.
In Edwin A. Thomas v. State of Indiana, a 17-page opinion, Judge Robb writes:
Thomas’ convictions under Counts 1 and 3 do not violate Article I, Section 14, but his conviction under Count 4 does and must be vacated. Thomas’ convictions under Counts 5 and 6 do not violate Article I, Section 14. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Thomas’ motion for a mistrial because Thomas did not show that he was placed in a position of grave peril. The trial court erred in enhancing Thomas’ sentences because the in loco parentis aggravator violated Thomas’ right to trial by jury under the Sixth Amendment, and because Thomas’ criminal history was not of sufficient weight to justify an enhancement. We remand the case to the trial court so that it can vacate Thomas’ conviction under Count 4 and reduce Thomas’ remaining sentences to the presumptive sentence. Otherwise, Thomas’ convictions are affirmed.
Posted by Marcia Oddi on January 20, 2006 03:07 PM
Posted to Ind. App.Ct. Decisions