« Ind. Law - Telecom: Phone dereg moving full-speed ahead | Main | Ind. Courts - Plan to link 400 courts takes another step »

Monday, February 13, 2006

Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals decides six today

In D.B. v. State of Indiana, a 14-page opinion, Judge May concludes:

The evidence supports the juvenile court’s true findings of rape and child molesting. D.B.’s adjudication as a delinquent for rape and child molesting based on a single act of nonconsensual sexual intercourse violates the double jeopardy protections of the Indiana Constitution. D.B.’s placement with the Department of Correction until his eighteenth birthday was not an abuse of discretion. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying D.B. credit for his pre-dispositional detention. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the juvenile court with instructions that it vacate the true finding of child molesting.
In Douglas Castro v. State of Indiana Office of Family and Children, a 16-page opinion, Judge Vaidik writes:
Douglas Castro appeals the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights to his daughter, T.P. Specifically, Castro argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s decision and that he was denied due process of law during the CHINS/termination proceeding. Castro also contends that Indiana’s entire CHINS/termination scheme is unconstitutional in that it deprives all parents of due process of law. Finding that the trial court’s decision to terminate Castro’s parental rights was supported by clear and convincing evidence and that the requirements of the Due Process Clause were satisfied, we affirm the termination of Castro’s parental rights. We also hold that Indiana’s CHINS/termination scheme does not violate the Due Process Clause.
In William B. Hepburn and Lois M. Wilbur Hepburn v. Tri-County Bank, a 13-page opinion, including a one-page dissent, Judge May writes:
Lois M. Wilbur Hepburn and William Hepburn appeal the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Tri-County Bank. They raise one issue on appeal, which we restate as whether the guaranty Lois signed in 2002, which indicated it was “unsecured,” was nevertheless secured by mortgages she had signed in 1998, 1999, and 2002 because those earlier executed mortgages included dragnet clauses. We affirm.

KIRSCH, C.J., concurs.
ROBB, J., dissents with opinion.

The majority declines to adopt Lois’ reasoning that the Bank waived the opportunity to assert the mortgages secured the guaranty because the Bank marked the guaranty “unsecured.” I agree with Lois and thus, must respectfully dissent.

I agree that the dragnet clauses in the mortgages could have attached the mortgages to the later-executed guaranty, as the language of the clauses is quite broad. However, the mere fact that they could have does not necessarily mean that they have to. The dragnet clause gives priority in future advances to the Bank if the Bank desires, but not does require it. That the Bank marked the guaranty “unsecured” manifests an affirmative intention not to attach the mortgages. Under these circumstances, I would hold that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for the Bank.

In Re: Commitment of C.J. v. Midtown Comm. Mental Health Center - involuntary commitment, affirmed.

In Phillip E. Schlabach v. State of Indiana, a 16-page opinion, Judge Crone concludes:

Without informing Schlabach, the trial court improperly permitted the jury to consider an inadmissible and highly prejudicial document of which Schlabach was unaware and which the State did not intend to offer into evidence. We therefore reverse Schlabach’s convictions and remand for a new trial.
In David Stainbrook as Pers. Rep. v. Trent Low, a 19-page opinion, Judge Vaidik writes:
David Stainbrook, as personal representative of the Estate of Howard W. Stainbrook, appeals the trial court’s grant of specific performance of a real estate agreement to Trent Low. We find (1) that the trial court properly denied the Estate’s motion to dismiss for lack of verification because the Estate failed to bring their motion until the start of trial, and the claimant was available and prepared to testify at that time, and (2) that specific performance was an appropriate remedy in this case. Therefore, we affirm.

Posted by Marcia Oddi on February 13, 2006 12:15 PM
Posted to Ind. App.Ct. Decisions