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Wednesday, April 26, 2006

Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals decides two today

In Paul Meyers v. James and Eva Meyers d/b/a J. Meyers Construction, Inc., an 18-page opinion (with a concur/dissent by Chief Judge Kirsch on p. 18), Judge Robb concludes:

An employee who has been fired for exercising his statutory right to overtime pay can bring a claim for retaliatory discharge under the public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine created in Frampton. The trial court erred in granting J. Meyers Construction’s motion to dismiss Meyers’ retaliatory discharge claim because Meyers alleged sufficient facts to support such a claim. The trial court also erred in granting J. Meyers Construction’s motion to dismiss James and Eva as defendants because Meyers alleged sufficient facts to survive this motion. The trial court’s order granting J. Meyers Construction’s motion to dismiss is therefore reversed, and we remand for further proceedings.

MAY, J., concurs.
KIRSCH, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion.

Our Supreme Court in Morgan Drive Away, Inc. v. Brant, 489 N.E.2d 933 (Ind. 1986) stated the “employment at will doctrine has steadfastly been recognized and enforced as the public policy of this State” and observed that the “[r]evision or rejection of the doctrine is better left to the legislature.”

In Keybank National Association v. Grant F. Shipley, an 18-page opinion, Judge Vaidik writes:
KeyBank National Association (“KeyBank”) appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of attorney Grant Shipley on its negligence claim. Specifically, KeyBank contends that Shipley, who was the attorney for a receiver, owed a duty to KeyBank, a creditor of the receivership. Although a receiver owes a duty to a creditor, Indiana courts have not yet addressed whether an attorney for a receiver owes a duty to a creditor. After analyzing our case law, the law of other states, and various public policies, we conclude that a receiver’s attorney does not owe a duty to a creditor and therefore cannot be held liable for negligence. Instead, the creditor’s remedy is to sue the receiver, which in turn can sue its attorney for malpractice. We therefore affirm the trial court.

Posted by Marcia Oddi on April 26, 2006 01:42 PM
Posted to Ind. App.Ct. Decisions