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Tuesday, February 06, 2007

Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals issues 5 today (and 8 NFP)

[The ILB has just returned from serving jury duty.]

(Link to Cases):

For publication opinions today (5):

Paula M. Novotny v. Renewal By Anderson Corp., et al - "Issue. Whether the trial court erred in granting the motion by Andersen and AGF to compel arbitration of Novotny’s claims against Andersen and AGF." The Court here concludes that although the Uniform Arbitration Act “specifically exempts from its coverage all consumer leases, sales, and loan contracts,” as those terms are defined in the Uniform Consumer Credit Code. Ind. Code § 34-57-2-1, the parties can bargain that away via a consumer credit sale agreement and security agreement which contains an arbitration clause.

Lillie Randles, et al v. Indiana Patient's Compensation Fund and South Bend Memorial Hospital - affirmed.

Janice L. Taylor v. Community Hospital of Indiana - affirmed.

In John Doe v. Town of Plainfield, Indiana, a 13-page opinion, Judge Sharpnack writes:

John Doe brings this interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s grant of the Town of Plainfield’s (“Plainfield”) motion to reconsider an earlier order that had allowed Doe to proceed anonymously. Doe raises one issue, which we revise and restate as whether the trial court abused its discretion when it granted Plainfield’s motion to reconsider and denied Doe’s request to proceed anonymously. We reverse and remand. * * *

“This unusual practice has been permitted in exceptional cases where the party has a privacy right so substantial as to outweigh the customary and constitutionally-embedded presumption of openness in judicial proceedings.” * * *

“[Courts have] identified a number of factors that should be considered to determine whether a plaintiff’s interest in privacy is so significant as to outweigh the strong presumption favoring public identification of litigants.” Id. These factors include: (1) whether the plaintiff is challenging governmental activity; (2) whether the plaintiff would be required to disclose information of the utmost intimacy; (3) whether the plaintiff would be compelled to admit his or her intention to engage in illegal conduct, thereby risking criminal prosecution; (4) whether the plaintiff would risk suffering injury if identified; (5) whether the party defending against a suit brought under an anonym would be prejudiced; (6) whether the interests of children are at stake; (7) whether there are less drastic means of protecting legitimate interests of either the party seeking anonymity or the opposing party; (8) the extent to which the identity of the litigant has been kept confidential; and (9) the public interest in knowing the litigant’s identities. * * *

Doe argues that four factors are relevant to this analysis. Specifically, Doe argues that the following factors support his position: (A) he is challenging governmental action; (B) disclosure of Doe’s name would subject him to threats of physical harm to himself and his child; (C) Plainfield will not be prejudiced by the anonymity of Doe’s name; and (D) there is no strong public interest in the disclosure of Doe’s name. * * *

In summary, all relevant factors favor anonymity and we conclude that Doe’s need for anonymity outweighs the presumption of openness in judicial proceedings. See City of Indianapolis, 2006 WL 2289187 at 2. Thus, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted Plainfield’s motion to reconsider and denied Doe’s request to proceed anonymously.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s grant of Plainfield’s motion to reconsider and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded.

See also this brief story this afternoon in the Indianapolis Star.

Oddly, no record of this case (32A01-0605-CV-188) appears in the Clerk of the Courts docket. Surely that is not part of the authorization to proceed anonymously.

Paul Hamilton v. Morgan Prewett is a 30-page opinion, including a concurring opinion beginning on p. 23. As set out in Judge Baker's opinion:

Prewett and his wife, Georgia Prewett (Georgia), reside in Daviess County. Hamilton maintains his business, Hamilton Water Conditioning, in Daviess County. Neither the record nor the parties’ briefs address how the parties were acquainted, if at all. On June 21, 2002, Hamilton filed a lawsuit against the Prewetts in the Daviess County Superior Court after Hamilton found a website entitled “Paul Hamilten—The World’s Smartest Man” (the Website), which Hamilton claims defamed him and his business. Hamilton’s complaint alleged claims of defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damages. On September 25, 2002, Hamilton filed an Amended Complaint and added his son, Michael Hamilton (Michael), as a party plaintiff because Michael was the legal owner of Hamilton Water Conditioning.

While there was a one-letter difference between the man on the website, “Paul Hamilten” (“Hamilten”), and appellant Paul Hamilton, Prewett has never denied that he was the author of the Website or represented that the Website was not a reference to Hamilton or Hamilton Water Conditioning. Instead, as detailed below, Prewett argues that the Website was a form of comedy, parody, or satire. The Website was written from the perspective of “Hamilten,” a man in the business of water conditioning, and portrayed “Hamilten” as a manipulative individual both personally and professionally. * * *

In light of the parodistic nature of the Website taken as a whole, we hold that the Website is a parody because no reasonable person could believe its claims to be true. Therefore, Hamilton’s defamation claim must fail because parody cannot constitute a false statement of fact and cannot support a defamation claim. 50 Am. Jur. 2d Libel and Slander § 156 (2006); New Times, 146 S.W.3d. at 161. Because the Website is a parody, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Prewett.7 See Gatto, 774 N.E.2d at 923 (holding that the determination of whether a communication is defamatory is to be presented to the jury as a question of fact only if the communication is reasonably susceptible to either defamatory or non-defamatory interpretation). * * *

In the interest of judicial economy, both parties ask that we determine whether the anti-SLAPP statute applies to Hamilton’s lawsuit. * * *

While we acknowledge that there may be instances where entertainment is a public issue or an issue of public interest that warrants anti-SLAPP protection, we do not find this to be one of those occasions. Hamilton’s suit against Prewett, while unsuccessful on the merits, is not the type of lawsuit that the anti-SLAPP statute was enacted to prevent. Unlike the plaintiffs in the previous Indiana anti-SLAPP cases, Hamilton did not file his suit to stifle Prewett’s speech on a public issue or an issue of public interest.

NFP civil opinions today (4):

John A. Bricker v. General Industries Partners, et al. (NFP)

In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationships of N.H. and E.M., minor children and their father, Gregory Hardister v. Marion County Division of Child Services (NFP)

In the Matter of Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of J.A., M.P.B., M.L.B., A.M.S., J.S. & L.J.S.; Ursula Johnson v. Lake County Office of Family and Children (NFP)

In the Matter of K.B., K.S.B. and J.B.; Sabrina Byrd v. Lake County Department of Child Services (NFP)

NFP criminal opinions today (4):

Anthony Logan v. State of Indiana (NFP)

John Harlow v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Fredrick Michael Baer v. State of Indiana (NFP)

C.G. v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Posted by Marcia Oddi on February 6, 2007 01:53 PM
Posted to Ind. App.Ct. Decisions