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Thursday, July 26, 2007

Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals issues 1 today (and 8 NFP)

For publication opinions today (1):

In Ronald C. Felder v. State of Indiana , a 10-page opinion, Chief Judge Baker writes:

Appellant-defendant Ronald C. Felder appeals the ten-year sentence that was imposed following his guilty plea to Robbery,1 a class B felony. Specifically, Felder argues that the sentence must be vacated because the trial court did not identify his decision to plead guilty as a mitigating circumstance. Felder also claims that the trial court erred “by failing to specifically grant [him] good time credit.” Appellant’s Br. p. 1. Finding that Felder’s decision to plead guilty should have been identified as a significant mitigating circumstance, but also determining that the ten-year sentence is appropriate, we decline to revise his sentence. We also find that there was no error when the trial court did not separately grant good time credit for the time that Felder was incarcerated prior to sentencing. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
NFP civil opinions today (3):

In Charles Dowell, et al v. Mary Scheurich, et al (NFP), a 9-page opinion, Chief Judge Baker writes:

Appellants-intervenors Charles Dowell, et al. (collectively, the intervenors), appeal the trial court’s denial of their motion to intervene in an action regarding the grant of a building permit that was initially brought by appellees-plaintiffs/property owners Sue Ann Bell, et al. (collectively, the plaintiffs). The intervenors argue that their motion should have been granted because their interests were directly affected by an agreed judgment involving the plaintiffs and the appellees-defendants, Mary Scheurich—Jasper County’s Director of Planning and Development (Director)—and other county officials, (collectively, the defendants). Specifically, the intervenors contend that the trial court erred in denying their motion because they were neighboring property owners and the prior judgment adversely
affected their property rights. Concluding that the intervenors are collaterally estopped from challenging the judgment, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. * * *

As our prior memorandum decision indicates, the individuals who filed the prior motion to intervene were not permitted to collaterally attack the agreed judgment in their separate litigation. Likewise, to allow the current intervenors to prevail would permit them to collaterally attack the judgment in the case. Although the intervenors in this case were individuals other than those involved in the first case, their arguments and interests were the same. They are simply not entitled to continue to file new motions based upon new theories or attempt to relitigate issues that have previously been decided. Put another way, having failed to establish a basis for intervention in the first motion to intervene, the Sculley Square neighbors were not entitled to make the very same arguments for intervention a second time. That said, the time for finality has arrived, and we conclude that the trial court properly denied the motion to intervene.

James Loomis v. Barbara Loomis (NFP) - "Because there was no request that A.L. be reimbursed for the vehicle before us, we should not have directed the trial court to order James to pay $1,500 for one-half of the vehicle’s cost, and we hereby vacate that portion of our original decision. In all other respects—including the instruction to determine whether the cost of A.L.’s vehicle and related expenses are already included in James’s child support payment—we deny James’s petition for rehearing and leave our original decision unchanged."

Paternity of N.S.L., Karen S. Gramling v. Steven A. LeFebvre (NFP) - "The analysis of these factors does not change when we apply the slightly altered standard of review described above, and we reach the same conclusion as we did in our original decision. Thus, we grant the petition for rehearing and revise the standard of review as stated herein. In all other respects, we deny the petition for rehearing and leave the original decision unchanged."

NFP criminal opinions today (5):

Ebony Dance v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Antoine Tinder v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Darryl Samuel Howard v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Ralph Patterson v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Korey A. Alwood v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Posted by Marcia Oddi on July 26, 2007 12:48 PM
Posted to Ind. App.Ct. Decisions