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Wednesday, October 17, 2007
Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals issues 4 today (and 7 NFP)
For publication opinions today (4):
In City of Carmel, IN. v. Certain Home Place Annexation Territory Landowners , a 16-page opinion, Judge Vaidik writes:
In this case, Certain Home Place Annexation Territory Landowners (“the Remonstrators”) successfully challenged an annexation attempt by the City of Carmel (“Carmel”). Carmel now appeals, complaining that the trial court improperly engaged in an audit of its fiscal plan when it found that Carmel failed to sufficiently and specifically set forth the methods of financing the planned services to be provided to Home Place following annexation. In light of the Indiana Supreme Court’s recent opinion in City of Carmel v. Certain Southwest Clay Township Annexation Territory Landowners, 868 N.E.2d 793 (Ind. 2007) (“Southwest Clay”)—in which our Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s order that Carmel may not annex territory in Southwest Clay—and Carmel’s accountant’s testimony supplementing the fiscal plan, we conclude that Carmel met its burden of proving the statutory prerequisite that the fiscal plan must show “[t]he method or methods of financing the planned services.” The trial court’s judgment to the contrary is akin to a judicial audit and constitutes clear error. We therefore reverse the trial court. * * *The ILB has had a slew of entries on this dispute - here is the list. Oral arguments were held only a month ago. Here is a copy of the 10/4/05 trial court opinion. Recall also In the Matter of the Annexation Proposed by Ordinance No. 2004-11-38, et al v. Chris Fetcko, et al, decided by a different panel last week.Our Supreme Court has made clear that “courts reviewing annexation challenges should focus on whether the municipality made credible and enforceable commitments to provide equivalent services to similar areas. Courts are not authorized to dissect the minutiae of what are essentially legislative decisions.” * * * Although Mr. Reedy—who did not request any documents from Carmel, interview any Carmel officials, or audit Carmel’s books, disputed Carmel’s ability to finance the services, Mr. Coonrod testified that Carmel had more than enough money in its operating balance, which he labeled “Other available net revenue” in the fiscal analysis, to cover the initial deficits related to the annexation of Home Place. At the end of the day, it is apparent that Carmel has made credible and enforceable commitments to provide equivalent services to Home Place. In light of Southwest Clay and Mr. Coonrod’s testimony supplementing the fiscal plan, the trial court’s judgment that the fiscal plan did not meet the requirements of subsection (d)(2)—which requires the fiscal plan to show “[t]he method or methods of financing the planned services”—is akin to a judicial audit and constitutes clear error. Reversed.
Ronald E. Starr v. State of Indiana - "It is only a sentence—not the conviction itself—that may be challenged on direct appeal following a guilty plea. Starr cannot challenge his convictions in a direct appeal following his guilty plea."
Christopher Stephens v. State of Indiana - "The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it collaterally estopped Stephens from attacking the previous child support order in another proceeding before another court. The trial court correctly overruled Stephens’s Batson objection and did not err in finding that Stephens did not meet his burden to prove inability to pay. Finally, we find the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. We affirm."
In Chuck W. Adams v. Mauro Chavez, M.D., and Prison Health Services, a 12-page opinion, Judge Robb writes:
Chuck Adams appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his proposed medical malpractice complaint. On appeal, Adams raises four issues, one of which we find dispositive and restate as whether the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing Adams’s proposed complaint. We reverse and remand, concluding that the trial court abused its discretion because, when it dismissed Adams’s proposed complaint pursuant to Indiana Code section 34-18-10-14, there was no indication that Adams had failed to act as required by Indiana Code chapter 34-18-10. * * *We note in closing that our decision does not create a stalemate on remand.
NFP civil opinions today (6):
Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of D.S., S.E. and S.L.E.; Cher Steward v. Lake County Department of Child Services (NFP) - termination, affirmed.
Matter of R.D.A., a Child in Need of Services; Larry D. Alspach v. Miami County Department of Child Services (NFP) - CHINS determination, affirmed.
Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of E.S.; Katie Storey v. Marion County Department of Child Services (NFP) - termination, affirmed.
In Matter of the West Central Conservancy District v. Town of Avon (NFP), a 16-page opinion, Judge Friedlander writes:
West Central Conservancy District (the District), challenges the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Town of Avon (the Town). Upon appeal, the District presents five issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as whether summary judgment was appropriate.Paternity of A.K.W.; Lara Winters v. Matthew Ryan Cruse (NFP) - "Lara N. Winters (Mother) appeals the portion of a paternity judgment ordering the parties’ child, A.K.W., to assume the surname of her father, Matthew R. Cruse (Father). Mother presents the following restated issue for review: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering the child’s surname changed from Winters to Cruse? We affirm."We reverse and remand.
This case concerns the efforts of the District, a not-for-profit conservancy district established for the purpose of providing sewer services to certain areas in Hendricks County, to add a “purpose” providing it with authority to provide water supply and related services.
M Doed, LLC v. Marlan B. and Mary Esther Harris (NFP) - "A notice was sent to the Harrises by certified mail with a return receipt to the last address of the property owner as indicated by the auditor’s records, which was the address of the Property. As demonstrated by the evidence, the peculiarity of this case is that this address was not provided or authorized by the Harrises to be the tax bill address. Norma Wheeldon, a Tax Sale Clerk in the Delaware County Auditor’s Office, testified that the tax bill address was changed between the years 2002 and 2003, but that she did not have any knowledge as to how it was changed. Marlan Harris testified that he did not request, authorize, or have knowledge of the change of the tax bill address. He also testified that he did not receive any notices regarding the delinquent tax status of the Property and did not learn of the issue until receiving notification that the insurance on the Property had been cancelled, which occurred after Doed filed its petition. Based on these circumstances, the notice of the tax sale was not reasonably calculated to apprise the Harrises of the pendency of the action. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Doed’s petition to issue a tax deed. Affirmed."
NFP criminal opinions today (1):
Edward Hoffman v. State of Indiana (NFP)
Posted by Marcia Oddi on October 17, 2007 12:06 PM
Posted to Ind. App.Ct. Decisions