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Friday, May 02, 2008

Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals revives suit challenging state's school finance system

For publication opinions today (1):

In Joseph Bonner et al v. Mitch Daniels et al, a 40-page, 2-1 opinion, Judge Riley writes:

Appellants-Plaintiffs, Philip-Anthony Bonner, a minor, by his parents and next friends, Joseph and LaTanya Bonner, et al., On Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated (collectively, Bonner), appeal the trial court’s Order to Dismiss entered in favor of Appellees-Defendants, Mitch Daniels, Governor of the State of Indiana and Co-Chair of the Education Roundtable (Governor Daniels), Suellen K. Reed, Indiana State Superintendent of Public Education and Co-Chair of the Education Roundtable (Dr. Reed), and the Indiana State Board of Education (Board of Education) (collectively, Appellees). We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Bonner raises four issues on appeal, two of which we find dispositive and which we restate as follows: (1) Whether the trial court erred in dismissing Bonner’s cause finding that the justiciability standard precluded judicial review; and (2) Whether the trial court erred in finding that the Education Clause, encapsulated in Article VIII, §1 of the Indiana Constitution, does not provide judicially enforceable guidelines. * * *

Bonner presents us with a case of first impression. Although most other states have already determined the issues presented for our review, never before has an Indiana court been requested to answer Bonner’s questions. The vast majority of courts in our sister states have concluded that this cause is justiciable and that state constitutions impose enforceable duties on the legislative and executive branch to provide a quality education to public school students. * * *

[II] First, Bonner disputes the trial court’s dismissal of his cause based on the separation of powers doctrine and the trial court’s conclusion that any injury is not likely to be redressed by the relief sought. The parties’ respective arguments revolve around three main topics: (1) standing, (2) redressability of any injury, and (3) whether relief was sought from the proper defendants. * * *

In sum, we conclude that Bonner properly brought his declaratory judgment action. Mindful to accept all allegations in Bonner’s Complaint as true, Bonner has presented us with a question to define his legal rights under the Constitution’s Education Clause. See Nass, 718 N.E.2d at 764-65. In line with a declaratory action’s purpose, our response will afford relief from uncertainty and will serve a useful purpose.

[III] Disputing the trial court’s determination that the cause cannot proceed because there is no reasonably clear standard for interpreting the Education Clause, Bonner reflects on the article’s rich history, language, and case law to garner guidelines in order to enforce the constitutional provision. On the other hand, the Appellees generalize that “broadly worded” provisions of the Indiana Constitution are “not subject to judicial enforcement.” * * *

Clearly, as shown, the Education Clause is subject to judicial enforcement. As such, in our quest to interpret Article VIII of our State’s constitution, we turn to the language of the text in the context of the history surrounding its drafting and ratification, the purpose and structure of our Constitution, and case law interpreting the specific provisions. * * *

Commencing with Indiana’s Education Clause, and interpreting it in light of the clause’s historical mandate and our sister states’ persuasive precedents, we hold that Article VIII imposes a duty on the State to provide an education that equips students with the skill and knowledge enabling them to become productive members of society. * * *

We find that Bonner has made a cognizable claim that can be considered by the court. Assuming Bonner can submit proof of his claim, a court can grant a declaration that the General Assembly has not discharged its duty. Ultimately, what constitutes an education that is commensurate with contemporary requirements and which instills skill and knowledge into our students is a matter of fact subject to proof. Likewise, the effect of the General Assembly’s current school financing system on attaining an education as envisioned by the Education Clause is a matter of fact subject to proof.

We hasten to add that it is not our intention to intrude upon the prerogatives of other branches of government. We were not appointed to establish educational policy, nor to determine the proper way to finance its implementation. We leave such matters to the two co-equal branches of government: it is for the Legislature and the Governor to fulfill their responsibility with respect to defining the specifics of, and the appropriate means to provide a public education, which should instill in Indiana’s children the knowledge and learning essential for today’s workplace.

Today, we reverse the trial court’s Order and remand back to determine whether Indiana’s current public school system through its funding provides our students with an education, as envisioned by the framers of our Constitution.

[Conclusion] Based on the foregoing, we find that the trial court erred in dismissing Bonner’s cause as his claim is clearly justiciable and subject to judicial review and, additionally, we find that the Education Clause, encapsulated in Article VIII, §1 of the Indiana Constitution, provides Indiana’s children with the right to a public education, as envisioned by the framers of our Constitution. We reverse and remand for further proceedings pursuant to this decision.

SHARPNACK, J., concurs.
FRIEDLANDER, J., dissents with opinion. [which concludes] I believe the appellants’ lawsuit in this case asks us to sit in judgment of decisions made by the Indiana Legislature that are firmly within the discretion accorded to that body by the Education Clause. Upon the same rationale articulated by our Supreme Court in Robinson, I would hold that such action is beyond our purview.

NFP civil opinions today (0):

NFP criminal opinions today (2):

Stephen Walker v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Christopher M. Holman v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Posted by Marcia Oddi on May 2, 2008 11:22 AM
Posted to Ind. App.Ct. Decisions