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Monday, March 09, 2009
Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals issues 2 today (and 18 NFP)
For publication opinions today (2):
In In Re: J.D. v. State of Indiana , a 7-page opinion, Judge Friedlander concludes:
In this case, Officers Kinsey, Casavan, and Burnett observed J.D. and other juveniles sitting on a porch with open and empty containers of alcohol sitting around the porch. Moreover, J.D. “was sitting right next to some of the empty cans and some cans that had some alcohol in them.” Although the officers did not witness J.D. actually drinking beer, the fact that he is a minor, coupled with his close proximity to the open cans of beer on the porch, was sufficient to cause an ordinarily prudent person to believe that criminal activity had or was about to occur. See Williams v. State, 754 N.E.2d 584. Thus, considering the totality of the circumstances, see Greeno v. State, 861 N.E.2d 1232 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), the facts then known to the officers were sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, regardless of whether the officers actually saw J.D. drinking the beer or holding the can in his hands. The detention of J.D. thus did not offend Fourth Amendment principles.In Sherri Lemon v. Wishard Health Services, a 9-page opinion, Chief Judge Baker writes:We reach a similar result when analyzing J.D.'s claim under the Indiana Constitution. The analysis under the Indiana Constitution is much the same as that under the Fourth Amendment. Article 1, section 11 of the Indiana Constitution guarantees the rights of liberty, privacy, and free movement and investigatory stops constitute a seizure, invoking the protections of that provision. Taylor v. State, 639 N.E.2d 1052 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). Those rights are not absolute, however, but must be balanced against society's right to protect itself. Atkins v. State, 834 N.E.2d 1028. We must balance these sometimes competing rights by considering the reasonableness of the intrusion and, where appropriate, permit brief investigatory stops based upon reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. * * *
As explained above with respect to J.D.'s Fourth Amendment claim, the police officers observed J.D. sitting in very close proximity to open beer cans, with what appeared to be marijuana strewn about on the ground. This would cause an ordinarily prudent person to believe that criminal activity (minor consumption of alcohol) had or was about to occur, thus giving rise to the requisite reasonable suspicion under Terry. J.D.'s detention did not contravene article 1, section 11 of the Indiana Constitution and the juvenile court did not err in failing to exclude the evidence on that basis. Judgment affirmed.
Appellant-plaintiff Sherri Lemon, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, appeals the trial court?s order denying her motion for class certification. Lemon argues that the trial court erred by concluding that potential class members are required to submit their wage claims to the Indiana Department of Labor (DOL) before they are permitted to be members of a class action seeking penalties for the late payment of wages pursuant to the Wage Claims Act.1 Finding no error, we affirm. Appellant-plaintiff Sherri Lemon, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, appeals the trial court?s order denying her motion for class certification. Lemon argues that the trial court erred by concluding that potential class members are required to submit their wage claims to the Indiana Department of Labor (DOL) before they are permitted to be members of a class action seeking penalties for the late payment of wages pursuant to the Wage Claims Act. Finding no error, we affirm. * * *NFP civil opinions today (8):In sum, we find that a claimant seeking redress pursuant to the Wage Claims Act must first submit the claim to the DOL before filing a lawsuit in court. Furthermore, the act of filing a putative class action does not enable the putative class members to subvert the statutory requirements. Finally, the putative class members are not permitted to get authority to file suit after the suit has already been filed and, in any event, the statute of limitations has expired. For all these reasons, we affirm the trial court.
Kevin P. and Lisa F. Davis v. Drake Builders, LTD. (NFP)
Karla L. Lindsay v. Terry S. Lindsay (NFP)
Thomas M. Dixon v. Maria Cecillia Lucero (NFP)
Adrian Ross v. Jennifer Ross (NFP)
In the Matter of J.C. and D.H. v. Indiana Dept. of Child Services (NFP)
In the Matter of J.C. and D.H. v. Indiana Dept. of Child Services (NFP)
BR Associates v. Sondra Neal (NFP)
NFP criminal opinions today (10):
In Re: The Contempt of Arthur Miles v. State of Indiana (NFP) - "Arthur Miles appeals his ninety-day sentence for direct contempt of court. Miles argues the sentence was unreasonable because his refusal to testify did not prevent the trial from going forward. We affirm.
"The State wanted Miles’ testimony at a murder trial. Miles indicated he would invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege, and he was granted use immunity. Miles still refused to testify and the trial court found him in direct contempt."
Antonio Barbut v. State of Indiana (NFP)
John E. Turner v. State of Indiana (NFP)
Robert T. Cummins v. State of Indiana (NFP)
James Altes v. State of Indiana (NFP)
Kevin Simons v. State of Indiana (NFP)
Louis S. O'Neal v. State of Indiana (NFP)
Genard R. Richmond v. State of Indiana (NFP)
Jerry Liggin v. State of Indiana (NFP)
Onice Fields v. State of Indiana (NFP)
Joseph E. Deverick v. State of Indiana (NFP)
Posted by Marcia Oddi on March 9, 2009 12:49 PM
Posted to Ind. App.Ct. Decisions