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Friday, March 13, 2009
Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals issues 2 today (and 8 NFP)
For publication opinions today (2):
Two interesting opinions today, dealing with the old and the new: the Railroad Rights-of-Way Act; and eBay and PayPal user agreements (a case of first impression re jurisdiction in an eBay transaction).
In Timberlake, Inc. v. Daniel P. O'Brien, a 17-page railroad right-of-way dispute, Judge Riley writes:
On appeal, Timberlake contests the trial court’s determination that O’Brien holds a railroad right-of-way easement. In developing its argument, Timberlake focuses on CSX’s actions that might support an abandonment of the Railroad Property. Relying on CSX’s filing of intent of abandonment with the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) and CSX’s purported removal of the railroad tracks prior to the conveyance of the Railroad Property, Timberlake asserts that CSX had abandoned its property and could not convey any interest to O’Brien. Thus, Timberlake claims that O’Brien owns “nothing” and that the trial court erroneously concluded that O’Brien’s interest is superior to Timberlake’s fee simple interest.In Richard and Marlene Attaway v. Llexcyiss Omega and D. Dale York, a 13-page interlocutory appeal, Judge Crone writes:On the other hand, in his cross-appeal, O’Brien requests us to reverse the trial court’s conclusion that he merely holds a railroad right-of-way easement and to conclude that instead he owns an estate in fee in the Railroad Property. Interpreting the language used in the 1881 Deeds, O’Brien contends that each of the grantors intended to convey the strip of land to the railroad forever, thereby creating an estate in fee. Alternatively, O’Brien asserts that he, at a minimum, acquired an easement that can be used consistent with the express provisions in the deeds, i.e., “to pass and repass . . . engines, cars, horses, cattle, carts, wagons, and other vehicle.” * * *
In light of the clear language indicating the conveyance of a right-of-way combined with the limiting purpose to which the land was to be put, we conclude that the Deeds are properly construed as passing only an easement to the railroad, its successors, lessees and assigns and not a fee simple. * * *
Because an easement is a “right to use or control the land, . . . , for a specific limited purpose,” O’Brien’s use to transport goods or materials over the Railroad Property is necessarily restricted by the terms of the Deeds. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 548 (8 th ed. 2004). As such, O’Brien is only allowed to “pass and repass by themselves, their servants, agents and employees with their engines, cars, horses, cattle, carts, wagons and other vehicle, and transport freight and passengers, and do all other things properly connected with or incident to the location, building, maintaining and servicing the [Railroad Property][.]” (Appellant’s App. pp. 249, 252, and 255). Granting O’Brien anything more would effectively transform the easement into a fee simple.
Thus, in light of the designated evidence before us, we conclude that CSX conveyed its easement in the Railroad Property to O’Brien by quitclaim deed on June 28, 1990. Because of the Deeds’ restrictive language, O’Brien’s use of the easement is O’Brien anything more would effectively transform the easement into a fee simple. limited to the purposes set forth in the 1881 Deed documents. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Timberlake’s motion for summary judgment.
CONCLUSION. Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court properly determined that O’Brien holds a railroad right-of-way easement, the usage of which is restricted by the provisions included in the 1881 Deeds. Affirmed.
[ILB Note: Footnote 4, on p. 15, examining the statutory history of the Rights-of-Way Act, was of particular interest to the ILB.]
Richard and Marlene Attaway (“the Attaways”) bring this interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s denial of their motion to dismiss. We affirm and remand.NFP civil opinions today (4):Issues: I. Did the trial court err by denying the Attaways’ motion to dismiss? II. Is venue in Clay County proper? III. Do the eBay and PayPal user agreements prohibit the parties from
litigating their dispute?[ILB - The Indiana sellers, residents of Indiana, listed a Porsche for sale on eBay. The Attaways, residents of Idaho, entered a bid of $5,000 plus delivery costs. After being notified that they had “won” the auction, the Attaways submitted payment to seller through PayPal, which charged the amount to the Attaways’ MasterCard account. On or about February 5, 2006, the Attaways arranged for CarHop USA, a Washington-based auto transporter, to pick up the Porsche in Indiana and deliver it to their Idaho residence. After taking delivery of the Porsche, the Attaways filed a claim with PayPal, asking
for a refund of its payment to seller because the Porsche was “significantly not-as-described” in its eBay listing. On March 8, 2006, PayPal informed the Attaways via email that their claim was denied and encouraged them to “work directly with the buyer to find a resolution.” It appears that, soon thereafter, the Attaways convinced MasterCard to rescind the payment that was made to sellers.]On December 27, 2006, Omega and York filed suit against the Attaways in small claims court, demanding $5,900 in damages. On February 1, 2007, the Attaways filed an answer and a motion to dismiss with prejudice, citing, among other things, lack of personal jurisdiction. On August 21, 2007, the trial court denied the motion. On September 24, 2007, the Attaways filed a motion to certify order for appeal. On October 3, the Attaways filed a motion to stay proceedings pending appeal, which the trial court granted. This interlocutory appeal ensued.
I. Personal Jurisdiction. The Attaways claim that the trial court erred in denying their motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. * * *
The instant case is one of first impression in Indiana and perhaps in the country. Several state and federal courts have addressed jurisdictional issues in eBay transaction cases where dissatisfied buyers have sued sellers, alleging misrepresentation. Our research, however, has not revealed any cases in which an eBay seller has sued a buyer for rescission of payment after the buyer has picked up the item in the seller’s state. These distinctions are significant to our analysis. * * *
Here, the Indiana sellers, Omega and York, filed suit against the Idaho buyers, the Attaways, after the Attaways took delivery of the vehicle and then rescinded payment. As mentioned above, the Attaways were able to see the sellers’ location prior to making their bid on the Porsche. Presumably, a person considering placing a bid in an online auto auction would note the vehicle’s location, particularly when, as here, the seller states that the buyer will be responsible for arranging and paying for delivery. Obviously, delivery fees could vary significantly, depending upon how far away the vehicle is from the buyer’s home.
By submitting a bid, the Attaways agreed to appear, in person or by representative, in Indiana to pick up the vehicle. After they “won” the Porsche, they hired an auto shipping company, based in Washington, to enter the state of Indiana as their representative, pick up the Porsche, and deliver it to them in Idaho. In sum, during the course of this transaction, there was more than just a single online purchase to satisfy the personal jurisdiction requirements of the federal due process clause. Therefore, we conclude that the Attaways purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities within the State of Indiana such that they could reasonably anticipate defending a lawsuit in Indiana related to this eBay purchase.
As for whether the attachment of personal jurisdiction comports with “fair play and substantial justice[,]” we consider the factors set forth above. See Burger King Corp. at 476. It appears that the burden on the Attaways is no greater than the burden would be on Omega and York if they were forced to bring this case in Idaho. As for efficient resolution of the controversies, it is not evident that there would be greater travel expenses or inconvenience for more people if the case is tried in Indiana. In weighing the interests of the states, it is certainly within the bounds of fair play and substantial justice to allow Indiana to exercise personal jurisdiction over individuals who have entered into a contract with an Indiana resident for the purchase of property located in Indiana, have removed that property from the state of Indiana, and then rescinded payment.
Based on all of the above, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the Attaway’s motion to dismiss.
II. Small Claims Rules. The Attaways also argue that pursuant to the Small Claims Rules, venue in Clay County is improper because “[a]t no time did the Attaways enter into a transaction which availed themselves of Clay County.” Appellant’s Br. at 12. As Omega and York point out, the Attaways sent a representative to Clay County to pick up the vehicle after it was purchased. This action was sufficient to establish venue in Clay County.
III. Online Dispute Resolution Process. The Attaways also contend that eBay and PayPal users are required to use those websites’ dispute resolution processes in lieu of litigation. They direct us to the current PayPal user agreement and eBay dispute resolution procedures posted online, although we have no way of knowing if these were the versions in effect at the time of the transaction in this case. At any rate, the Attaways fail to show us any language within these documents suggesting that the online dispute resolution process is a buyer or seller’s sole recourse in the event a dispute arises. Moreover, the Attaways fail to cite any caselaw in which an eBay dispute has been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on these grounds. Therefore, this argument must fail.
We hereby affirm the trial court’s denial of the Attaways’ motion to dismiss and remand for trial.
ROBB, J., concurs.
BROWN, J., concurs with separate opinion. [which reads in full] I concur with the majority opinion but write separately to clarify that my concurrence is based on the specific facts before us, and that in weighing the interests of the states under these particular circumstances, it would be outside the bounds of fair play and substantial justice to require the seller, who is now without both the vehicle and the money for it, to bring this case in Idaho.
Dennis M. Horrall, as Successor Trustee of the Mary Y. Skelton Revocable Living Trust, et al. v. Phyllis J. Motts, et al. (NFP) - A 28-page opinion by Judge Crone, where the issues are: "I. Whether the probate court erred when it invalidated the January 24, 2006 Amendment to Yvonne's trust based on the presumption of undue
influence, which had not been pled; II. Whether the probate court erred by invalidating the April 7, 2006 Amendment to Yvonne‟s trust based on the presumption of undue influence; and III. Whether remand to the probate court for determination of attorneys' fees is appropriate."
Lonnie Garner, Jr. v. Alan Finnan (NFP) - "For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Garner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus."
Ford Motor Company and TRW Vehicle Safety Systems, Inc. v. Sally Moore, et al (NFP) is a 28-page, 2-1 opinion where the majority concludes: "In light of the foregoing, the Estate failed to present sufficient evidence that Ford or TRW breached a duty of reasonable care. Accordingly, the negligence claim must fail and the jury verdict is reversed. Reversed." The dissent, beginning on p. 24, concludes: "In sum, based upon the standard of review and the evidence before me, I find that the Estate presented sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably conclude that a safer and feasible alternative to the conventional seatbelt was available that would have cost-effectively improved aggregate safety in all types of crashes."
NFP criminal opinions today (4):
Glenn Culler v. State of Indiana (NFP)
Robert Trimpl v. State of Indiana (NFP)
Stephanie Najjar v. State of Indiana (NFP)
In the Matter of: S.R. v. State of Indiana (NFP)
Posted by Marcia Oddi on March 13, 2009 11:36 AM
Posted to Ind. App.Ct. Decisions