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Tuesday, March 31, 2009

Ind. Decisions - Supreme Court issues four today

In The Indiana Dept. of Environmental Management v. Raybestos Products Co., on a petition for rehearing, Justice Boehm's opinion reads in full:

Raybestos has petitioned for rehearing from this Court’s December 9, 2008 opinion. Raybestos points out that the opinion incorrectly states the standard of review used by the Office of Environmental Adjudication in reviewing an action of IDEM. The first full paragraph of page 7 of the slip opinion states that OEA uses the standard of review provided by Indiana Code section 4-21.5-5-14 and may provide relief as permitted by section 4-21.5-5-15. Raybestos rightly points out that these statutes apply to judicial, not administrative review. We grant rehearing for the limited purpose of correcting this error and otherwise deny Raybestos’s Petition for Rehearing. [ILB - see Dec. 9 summary here.]
In Brian Tyler v. State of Indiana , an 11-page, 4-1 opinion, Justice Boehm writes:
We exercise our supervisory power to hold that a party may not introduce testimony via the Protected Person Statute if the same person testifies in open court as to the same matters. We also exercise our authority to revise the defendant‘s 110-year sentence to sixty-seven and one-half years. * * *

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted videotaped interviews with three of the children after the children had testified at trial. However, we remand the issue of Tyler‘s sentence to the trial court with instructions to issue an amended sentencing order in accordance with this opinion, without a hearing.

Shepard, C.J., and Rucker, J., concur.

Sullivan, J., concurs in result as to Part I and concurs as to Part II with separate opinion. [which begins, on p. 9] Sometimes having a new approach to the admissibility of evidence improves the administration of justice but I respectfully suggest that the status quo is superior to that adopted by the Court here.

Dickson, J., concurs and dissents with separate opinion: As to Part I of the Court's opinion, I agree with its holding regarding the permissible use of statements under the Protected Person Statute. * * *

As to Part II, however, I dissent. Adhering to "due consideration of the trial court's decision," as required by Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), I find that Judge Taul's evaluation and determination of the appropriate sentence for this defendant and these convictions does not warrant appellate intrusion.

In Tony R. Gray v. State of Indiana, an 8-page, 5-0 opinion, Justice Boehm writes:
Tony Gray was found guilty by a jury of robbing two fast-food restaurants while armed with a deadly weapon. We find the evidence sufficient to sustain a finding Gray was armed during the first robbery, but insufficient to sustain a finding Gray was armed during the second. * * *

This cause is remanded to the trial court with instructions to reduce Gray’s convictions on the Long John Silver’s crimes (Counts I and II) to Class C felony robbery and Class D felony criminal confinement. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

In Tommy R. Pruitt v. State of Indiana, a 56-page, 4-1 opinion, Justice Sullivan writes:
Tommy Ray Pruitt was sentenced to death for the murder of a Morgan County police officer. His conviction and sentence were upheld on direct appeal. We now affirm the post-conviction court‘s findings that Pruitt was not denied the effective assistance of trial or appellate counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, that he did not present it with newly discovered evidence that undermined confidence in his death sentence, and that his death sentence is not unconstitutional under the U.S. Supreme Court‘s decision in Atkins v. Virginia prohibiting sentencing persons with mental retardation to death. * * *

We affirm the PC court‘s denial of Pruitt‘s petition for post-conviction relief.

Shepard, C.J., and Dickson and Boehm, JJ., concur.

Rucker, J., dissents with separate opinion. [which reads in full] On direct appeal I was convinced that Pruitt was mentally retarded and thus not eligible for a death sentence. See Pruitt v. State, 834 N.E.2d 90, 123-26 (Ind. 2005) (Rucker, J., dissenting). After examining the evidence presented to the post-conviction court, I am even more convinced today. Pruitt‘s status has not changed. He was and still is mentally retarded. I would therefore reverse his death sentence and remand this cause with instructions to impose a term of years.

Posted by Marcia Oddi on March 31, 2009 03:11 PM
Posted to Ind. Sup.Ct. Decisions