The Indiana Law Blog: Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals issues 1 today (and 12 NFP)

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Wednesday, May 13, 2009

Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals issues 1 today (and 12 NFP)

For publication opinions today (1):

In State of Indiana v. Sampson Boadi , a 12-page opinion, Judge Vaidik writes:

Sampson Boadi was charged with several counts of criminal recklessness, including reckless homicide, as a result of an automobile collision that occurred when Boadi, driving a semi tractor-trailer, failed to stop at a red light. At the conclusion of the State's case-in-chief during Boadi's jury trial, the trial court granted Boadi's motion for a directed verdict on all counts on the ground that the recklessness element was not supported by sufficient evidence. Concluding that the trial court properly granted Boadi's motion because the State failed to introduce evidence of more than inadvertence or an error of judgment regarding Boadi's failure to stop at the red light, we affirm Boadi's acquittal. * * *

On appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred by granting a directed verdict acquitting Boadi of all the charges because a jury could have found from the evidence presented that Boadi's conduct was reckless. The State brings this appeal pursuant to Indiana Code § 35-38-4-2(4), whereby the State may appeal a question reserved by the State if the defendant is acquitted. However, the State is barred by the prohibition against double jeopardy from retrying the defendant after acquittal. State v. Martin, 885 N.E.2d 18, 19 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Although the issue in this case is now moot, we hope to provide guidance for future cases. * * *

In support of its argument that Boadi's conduct was reckless, the State relies on evidence provided by the State's accident reconstruction experts that Boadi had sufficient time to stop the vehicle before the light turned red but failed to do so, evidence that Boadi did not sound his horn before entering the intersection, and evidence that Boadi did not make an effort to stop the truck before entering the intersection. * * * We must now determine, as a matter of law, whether Boadi's failure to stop in time was evidence of recklessness sufficient to withstand a motion for directed verdict.

The parties have not directed us to, and we have not unearthed, a criminal case addressing whether the failure to stop at a red light, without more, can constitute evidence of recklessness sufficient to establish a prima facie case. However, in a civil action under the Automobile Guest Act, our Court held that failing to look to both sides and stop at an intersection could not constitute willful or wanton misconduct and affirmed the directed verdict in favor of the driver. * * *

We conclude that the rule provided in Becker should apply in the criminal context as well. This Court has previously found that a rule announced in actions under the Automobile Guest Act should apply in criminal cases as well because of the similarity in definition between “recklessness” in the criminal context and “wanton or willful misconduct” in the civil context. * * * Thus, we conclude that, pursuant to the rule in Becker, failing to stop at an intersection cannot, without more, constitute criminally reckless conduct. * * *

We are persuaded that the failure to stop at a red light due to inadvertence or an error of judgment, without more, does not constitute recklessness as a matter of law. Although the failure to stop at a red light or stop sign is a violation of the traffic code, we cannot say that, without additional circumstances, the failure to stop at a light is a substantial departure from the acceptable standards of conduct sufficient to serve as evidence of recklessness. * * *

Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, there is no evidence of additional circumstances sufficient to satisfy the recklessness element of the charges against Boadi. Boadi did not accelerate toward the light; indeed, Boadi traveled through the intersection at a speed below the speed limit. There is no evidence that Boadi was driving erratically or under the influence of alcohol or drugs. There is no evidence that Boadi was fatigued or in any way failing to comply with trucking regulations. Boadi stopped immediately after the accident and did not flee. In sum, the evidence as a whole viewed in the light most favorable to the State shows that Boadi did not stop but instead proceeded through the intersection as the light turned green for the opposing traffic. Although this conduct might be evidence of inadvertence or an error in judgment, that is, negligence, such an error does not constitute criminal recklessness. Additionally, our conclusion is consistent with Indiana's public policy that “automobile accident deaths caused by negligence, even gross negligence, fall outside the realm of criminal prosecution[.]” Id. * * *

In conclusion, the trial court did not err by acquitting Boadi as a matter of law due to a complete lack of evidence on the recklessness element of the crimes charged. Affirmed.

NFP civil opinions today (2):

John D. Michael v. Kathy M. Michael (NFP) - "Without reweighing the evidence or assessing witness credibility, we necessarily find that the testimony supports the conclusion that the marital estate did not include a loan or gift of $10,000 from Husband’s mother. Therefore, Husband’s argument must fail. "

Term. of the Parent-Child Rel. of D.D., et al; D.D. v. Indiana Dept. of Child Svcs. (NFP)

NFP criminal opinions today (10):

Corey Lee Perkins v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Donte T. Gibson v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Tony Johnson v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Steven L. Clair v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Claude Hoskins v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Curtis W. Craft v. State of Indiana (NFP)

J.W. v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Shakima Lewis v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Russell Lewis v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Jeffrey W. Wagner v. State of Indiana (NFP)