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Monday, May 18, 2009

Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals issues 3 today (and 10 NFP)

For publication opinions today (3):

In Mercantile National Bank of Hammond, et al. v. Robert Underwood , a 12-page pinion, Chief Judge Baker writes:

These parties and long-running litigation, which began in 1995, have been here before. In this appeal, we must determine whether a claim was “commenced” within the statute of limitations when it was initially improvidently filed as part of a proceeding supplemental. The answer is yes. * * *

The judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In Craig P. Coffman and Coffman Proactive CPA Svcs., LLC v. Olson & Co., P.C. , an 18-page opinion, Judge Kirsh writes:
Craig P. Coffman and Coffman Proactive CPA Services, LLC (collectively, “Appellants”), appeal the trial court's judgment in favor of Coffman's former employer, Olson & Company, P.C. (“Olson”), on Olson's claim for breach of a confidential non- disclosure and client proprietary agreement (“the Agreement”). Both sides appeal the trial court's damages award. The issues presented in this appeal are as follows: I. Whether Olson had a protectable interest that could be enforced by the noncompetition provision of the Agreement; and II. Whether the trial court erred by voiding the liquidated damages provision in the Agreement and calculating the damages award. We affirm. * * *
I. Enforceability of the Noncompetition Provision of the Agreement * * *

In the present case, the Agreement contains both a geographical limitation, Lawrence County and Monroe County, and a two-year time limitation on the restraint of trade. The noncompetition provision here is not against public policy. * * *

II. Liquidated Damages * * *

We find that the trial court correctly found the liquidated damages clause in the present case to be a penalty and, therefore, unenforceable. * * *

The trial court's award is within the scope of the evidence and is a reasonable determination of the damages award. Affirmed.

VAIDIK, J., concurs.
CRONE, J., dissents with separate opinion [disagreeing with the majority that Olson had established a legitimate interest that may be protected by a covenant not to compete] Moreover, absent actual damages, there is no basis for awarding liquidated damages, to which Olson claims it is entitled in its cross-appeal. Based on the foregoing, I would reverse and remand with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Appellants. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

In Indiana Patient's Compensation Fund v. Gary Patrick , a 13-page opinion, Judge Riley writes:
The Fund presents three issues on appeal, which we consolidate and restate as the following single issue: Whether the trial court erred when it granted Patrick an independent claim for damages for emotional distress in conjunction with his claim under the Adult Wrongful Death Statute. * * *

The Fund asserts that the trial court erred when it granted Patrick an independent claim for emotional distress damages in conjunction with his claim under the Adult Wrongful Death Statute. Because Patrick's claim derives from the death of his son, the Fund maintains that his claim is more properly characterized as derivative rather than independent and as such, clearly falls within the damage limitations of the Adult Wrongful Death Statute. However, the Fund continues, whereas the Adult Wrongful Death Statute provides for recovery of actual pecuniary losses, the Statute does not include a provision for the recovery of damages for emotional distress. Therefore, the Fund concludes that Patrick is not entitled to damages. Conceding that emotional distress damages are not permitted under the Adult Wrongful Death Statute, Patrick asserts that Indiana courts have repeatedly recognized that an independent action for emotional distress may proceed in conjunction with a claim for wrongful death.

We find that much of the confusion in this area of law stems from the fact that damages for emotional distress are treated differently depending upon the vehicle with which they are instituted: whether they are brought in combination with the Wrongful Death Statute or as part of the Medical Malpractice Act. * * *

On June 7, 2000, our supreme court signaled a new significant development in the law of negligent infliction of emotional distress when it decided Groves v. Taylor, 729 N.E.2d 569 (Ind. 2000). In Groves, the court adopted the bystander rule * * * The holding recognizes that the emotional distress claim does not arise from the death of another, but rather from the direct involvement of the individual bringing the claim in the events which have caused the emotional distress. In other words, the claim is not based upon harm suffered by another; it is based upon harm which is personal to the individual bringing the claim. * * *

Based on these facts, it is clear that Patrick witnessed the death of a loved one, a death caused by the negligent conduct of health care providers. As a result, we find that the trial court properly concluded that Patrick, as a bystander pursuant to Groves, could bring an independent claim for the negligent infliction of his emotional distress upon Christopher's death.

NFP civil opinions today (2):

In the Matter of: H.J.; A.J. v. Marion Co. Dept. of Child Svcs. (NFP)

Robert Heflin v. Star Wealth Management (NFP) - "In light of this evidence, it is apparent that the trial court was provided with no alternative but to appoint Star Wealth because Heflin was unable to manage his finances and Yolanda also demonstrated an inability to control the family debt. Moreover, Star Wealth had already been appointed legal custodian by the VA to handle Heflin’s funds, and it was familiar with the family’s financial circumstances. For all these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in appointing Star Wealth to serve as the guardian of Heflin’s estate. "

NFP criminal opinions today (8):

Dexter Young v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Daniel D. Dailey v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Christopher Smith v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Douglas Quinn v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Malcolm K. Ellis v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Michael Nelson v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Jessica Vasquez v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Alejandro Batana v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Posted by Marcia Oddi on May 18, 2009 01:05 PM
Posted to Ind. App.Ct. Decisions