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Thursday, May 07, 2009

Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals issues 2 today (and 4 NFP)

For publication opinions today (2):

In Steven A. Januchowski v. Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District, a 19-page, 2-1 opinion, Judge Vaidik writes:

While working for the Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District ("NICTD") as a carman, plaintiff Steven Januchowski alleged that he was injured by shifting panels as a result of NICTD’s negligence. NICTD operates a passenger commuter rail service from South Bend, Indiana, to Chicago, Illinois. Januchowski brought his claim under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), which provides a federal cause of action for railroad employees injured as a result of negligence. Januchowski brought his claim more than two years, but less than three years, after the alleged injuries. At trial, Januchowski argued that FELA’s three-year statute of limitation applied to his case. NICTD argued that Indiana’s general two-year statute of limitation for personal injury torts applied because of the Indiana Tort Claims Act (ITCA), and that, as a result, Januchowski’s claim was time-barred. Agreeing with NICTD on this point, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of NICTD. Because we find that FELA’s three-year statute of limitation applies under statutory law and our Supreme Court’s case law, we reverse and remand. * * *

RILEY, J., concurs.
DARDEN, J., dissents with separate opinion. * * * It is undisputed that Indiana courts and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction with respect to a claim under FELA. 45 U.S.C.A. § 56. As a result, in my opinion, when a FELA action is adjudicated in an Indiana state court, we apply "state procedural rules" and "federal substantive law." * * *

Given the concurrent subject matter jurisdiction of Indiana and federal courts, Januchowski had a choice of forums. However, the forum he chose was the state court. He chose to pursue his FELA claim under the Indiana Tort Claims Act, complying with its notice requirements and subsequently filing this action in an Indiana state court. I find that by choosing to file his action in the state court, he brought himself within the jurisdiction of Indiana’s procedural laws – including the Indiana procedural statute providing for a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

In Reynaldo A. Griffin v. State of Indiana, a 10-page, 2-1 opinion, Sr. Judge Sharpnack writes:
Griffin was arrested for possession of cocaine within 1,000 feet of school property. Griffin pled a defense pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-48-4-16 that he was “only briefly present near the school property and that no children were present.” Griffin did not testify at trial, and no defense witness testified as to the defense. Officer Walker testified that he had watched Griffin for some time before stopping him. * * *

In order to prove possession of cocaine as a Class D felony, the State must show that a person knowingly or intentionally possessed the drug. Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6(a). The offense is enhanced to a Class B felony if the person possesses cocaine in, on, or within 1000 feet of a public park. Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6(b)(2)(B). However, Ind. Code § 35-48-4-16(b) provides that it is a defense that (1) a person was briefly in, on, or within 1,000 feet of school property, and (2) no person under eighteen was in, on, or within 1,000 feet of school property. * * *

The jury, which was instructed on the defense, determined that Officer Walker's approximate five-minute observation of Griffin's walk down Campeau Street was sufficient to show that he was not “briefly” within 1,000 feet of the school. As we stated above, we will not impinge on a jury's determination unless “no reasonable fact finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” There is no ironclad rule as to what constitutes a “brief” presence, and we cannot say as a matter of law that the jury's determination was unreasonable under the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, the State's evidence was sufficient to rebut Griffin's defense. Affirmed.

MATHIAS, J., concurs.
FRIEDLANDER, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part. * * * Turning now to the instant case, the salient facts are that Griffin was walking a moped past a school when he was stopped by police. Although the term “briefly”, as used in I.C. § 35-48-4-16(b)(1), clearly imparts a temporal connotation, the time span itself is not the only element in this equation. Whether a particular time interval is “brief” is also a function of surrounding circumstances, including the defendant‟s intentions to be or remain near the school zone for any period of time, however short.

NFP civil opinions today (0):

NFP criminal opinions today (4):

Eric Emrich v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Kelly S. Shepherd v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Daemen Sampson v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Michael L. Brown v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Posted by Marcia Oddi on May 7, 2009 01:00 PM
Posted to Ind. App.Ct. Decisions