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Thursday, November 19, 2009

Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals issues 1 today (and 11 NFP)

For publication opinions today (1):

In Morton P. Maish v. State of Indiana , a 10-page opinion, Judge Brown writes:

“The question . . . is whether the inferences supporting the judgment were reasonable, not whether there were other "more reasonable" inferences that could have been made.” Brink v. State, 837 N.E.2d 192, 197 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1150 (Ind. 2004)), trans. denied. “Reaching alternative inferences such as this is a function of the trier of fact, not this Court. We cannot reverse the conviction merely because this inference is a plausible one that might have been drawn from the evidence.” Id. * * *

While the jury could have made different inferences from the evidence, we cannot say that the inference made by the jury here—that Maish was the one who transferred cocaine to Pence—was unreasonable. Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that evidence of probative value existed from which the jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Maish committed dealing in cocaine as a class B felony.

NFP civil opinions today (5):

Nathan and Kimberly Stevens v. A. Elaine McDonald, John Samuel, et al (NFP) - "Nathan and Kimberly Stevens appeal from a grant of summary judgment in favor of their neighbors, Samuel, John, and Elaine McDonald and John and Susan Grant (collectively, the Complainants) in the Complainants' action to enforce restrictive covenants. The Stevenses challenge the propriety of the grant of summary judgment as the sole issue on appeal. We affirm.

Starr Scott Amico v. Review Board of the Ind. Dept. of Workforce Development, et al. (NFP) "The sole issue presented for our review is whether the Review Board properly affirmed the decision of an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) dismissing Scott’s appeal as untimely. We affirm."

In re: R.C. and L.C.; D.C. v. Marion Co. Dept. of Child Svcs. (NFP)

Domus Properties v. Jason Cook (NFP)

Term. of Parent-Child Rel. of R.B.; R.D. v. IDCS (NFP)

NFP criminal opinions today (6):

In State of Indiana v. Natalie Medley (NFP), a 19-page opinion, Judge Crone writes:

Medley's testimony that she asked for an attorney on February 26 does not, standing alone, demonstrate that a motion to suppress her February 27 confession based on a re-initiation of interrogation theory would have been granted, and therefore the post-conviction court's determination that counsel's omission constitutes deficient performance is clearly erroneous. We therefore reverse the post-conviction court's conclusion that Medley received ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The post-conviction court also concluded that

had this Court not found that Ms. Medley should receive a new trial, the Court could have found and Ordered the Marion County Prosecutor to seek to reduce Ms. Medley's sentence and to produce evidence at the re-sentencing hearing of Ms. Medley's cooperation with the State and testimony against Marshaun Buggs, resulting in his conviction for the murder of Reginald Moore.
Appellant's Br. at 34. The State asserts that the post-conviction court is barred from issuing such an order by Article 3, Section 1 of the Indiana Constitution, which prohibits the three branches of governmentthe legislative, executive, and judicialfrom exercising the functions of the others. We agree. See Williams v. State, 669 N.E.2d 1372, 1378 (Ind. 1996) (“[T]he trial judge may not assume an adversarial role in the proceedings. In fact, to the extent that intervention by the trial court in the proceedings would constitute exercising the prosecutorial function, it would violate the separation of powers or functions article of the Indiana constitution.”) (citations omitted); Beanblossom v. State, 637 N.E.2d 1345, 1348-49 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (observing that case law indicates that trial court does not hold inherent judicial power to modify sentence); see also Ind. Code § 35-38-1-17 (“If more than three hundred sixty-five (365) days have elapsed since the convicted person began serving the sentence and after a hearing at which the convicted person is present, the court may reduce or suspend the sentence, subject to the approval of the prosecuting attorney....”). We therefore reverse the post-conviction court's alternative relief.
Shaun L. Steele v. State of Indiana (NFP)

D.S. v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Andre Dixon v. State of Indiana (NFP)

William T. Padgett, Jr. v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Steven T. Marbley-El v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Posted by Marcia Oddi on November 19, 2009 12:57 PM
Posted to Ind. App.Ct. Decisions