The Indiana Law Blog: Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals issues 3 today (and 18 NFP)

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Friday, February 26, 2010

Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals issues 3 today (and 18 NFP)

For publication opinions today (3):

In Syed Tajuddin v. Sandhu Petroleum Corporation Number 3, a 9-page opinion, Judge May writes:

Syed Tajuddin purchased property owned by Sandhu Petroleum Corporation Number 3 at a tax sale. He petitioned for a tax deed, and Sandhu objected. The trial court denied Tajuddin’s petition, finding he did not give proper notice to Sandhu and Sandhu was entitled to equitable relief. The court’s conclusions regarding notice are not supported by the evidence, but Sandhu is entitled to equitable relief. Therefore, we affirm. * * *

[W]e conclude this case is more like Atkins, where we granted equitable relief because the property owner relied on misinformation from a government officer and the tax sale was unlawful.

As we recognized in Swami, a “trial court has full discretion to fashion equitable remedies that are complete and fair to all parties involved.” Id. at 1178. “Equity has power, where necessary, to pierce rigid statutory rules to prevent injustice.” Id. Given the irregularity in the manner in which the property was assessed, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by granting Sandhu equitable relief.

In Susanne C. Gaudin, Robyn Rosenberg, et al. v. J.W. Austin, Darrell L. Kent, et al., an 8-page opinion, Judge May writes:

In September of 2007, the Brown County Commissioners enacted an ordinance establishing a fire district. In January 2009, after two new Commissioners were elected, the Commissioners enacted an ordinance purporting to dissolve the district. No petition to dissolve the district or to repeal the ordinance establishing it had been filed. Soon thereafter, Gaudin and the other plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging the dissolution ordinance was void because no petition had been filed.

The trial court granted summary judgment for the Commissioners: “there is nothing to compel a conclusion that a governing body with the authority to establish a Fire Protection District does not have a similar authority to dissolve a district by ordinance, particularly one established by ordinance.” (App. at 11.)

We reverse.

In Sunburst Chemical, LLC and Gary Jackson v. Acorn Distributors, Inc., a 7-page, 2-1 opinion, Judge May writes:

Sunburst Chemical, LLC, and Gary Jackson appeal the denial of their motion to transfer venue to Allen County. We affirm. * * *

On March 3, 2009, Acorn filed a complaint against Sunburst and Jackson (collectively, “Sunburst”) in Marion County. The complaint alleged Sunburst’s account with Acorn was past due. On March 23, 2009, Sunburst filed a motion to transfer venue to Allen County, arguing preferred venue was in Allen County because that is Sunburst’s principal place of business and Jackson’s county of residence. Acorn opposed transfer, arguing Sunburst had agreed to venue in Marion County by signing the account credit agreement. The trial court denied Sunburst’s motion. * * *

We agree with Sunburst that jurisdiction and venue are distinct concepts. See Hootman v. Finance Center Federal Credit Union, 462 N.E.2d 1064, 1066 n.7 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (noting jurisdiction involves the court’s ability to hear a particular case, whereas venue concerns the proper situs for trial). However, if we were to accept Sunburst’s argument that the agreement does not address venue, it would render the reference to Marion County meaningless. In fact, Sunburst’s argument suggests the entire provision is meaningless as applied to it, and that the provision is meant only to apply to businesses not otherwise subject to jurisdiction in Indiana. However, we must presume that Acorn placed the provision in the agreement for a purpose and that the reference to the courts of Marion County is intended to have meaning. See Shook, 835 N.E.2d at 541. Therefore, we conclude the agreement establishes venue in Marion County, and the trial court did not err by denying Sunburst’s motion to transfer venue. See Mechanics Laundry & Supply, 596 N.E.2d at 255 (enforcing contractual venue provision). Affirmed.

DARDEN, J., concurs.
KIRSCH, J., dissents with separate opinion. [that begins] I respectfully dissent.

Neither Sunburst Chemical, nor Gary Jackson consented to venue in Marion County; nor did they consent to Marion County as a forum for the resolution of any dispute that arose under the credit agreement. While they did consent to the personal jurisdiction of Marion County, they did not enter into a prorogation provision by which only Marion County would have jurisdiction.

NFP civil opinions today (4):

Company v. Review Board and S.H. (NFP) - "Employer's arguments that Claimant's conduct violated Employer's policies regarding break time and limits on personal conversations and Employer's vehicle policy are merely requests that we reweigh the evidence. Our standard of review does not permit us to engage in such an analysis. There is substantial evidence in the record to support the findings made by the Review Board. Those findings in turn support the Review Board's conclusion that Claimant's discharge was not for just cause."

In the Matter of S.V., E.V., and B.V.; J.V. and C.V. v. IDCS (NFP)

Term. of Parent-Child Rel. of C.B.; A.B. v. IDCS (NFP)

Term. of Parent-Child Rel. of G.F., B.W., F.W., K.W., and Z.W.; H.W. and C.W. v. IDCS (NFP)

NFP criminal opinions today (14):

State of Indiana v. James Shepherd (NFP) - "The State of Indiana appeals the trial court’s order that granted James Shepherd’s motion to suppress. The State raises the following restated issue: whether the trial court erred when it suppressed all evidence discovered by police after a patrol officer approached a parked vehicle at around 3:30 a.m., discovered an initially unresponsive driver, and smelled alcohol when the driver opened the car door. We reverse and remand."

James Johnson v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Dennis Snowdy v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Stevie Alsum v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Jeffrey Watson, Sr. v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Gregory A. Wilson v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Travis Conn v. State of Indiana (NFP)

James M. Schwartz v. State of Indiana (NFP)

J.J. v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Kenya Foy v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Briteya S. Evans v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Jeffrey Armstrong v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Darryl D. Hopkins v. State of Indiana (NFP)