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Friday, March 05, 2010

Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals issues 3 today (and 6 NFP)

For publication opinions today (3):

In Citizens State Bank of New Castle v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., et al., a 9-page opinion, Judge Crone concludes:

Specifically, we looked to a decision of the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, applying Indiana law, and its explanation for determining the priority rights of superior and junior lienholders in cases where the superior lienholder has acquired fee simple title to the mortgaged property by foreclosure sale and no longer holds a mortgage. See Brightwell v. United States, 805 F. Supp. 1464 (S.D. Ind. 1992)(citations omitted). * * *

Contrary to Countrywide and FNMA’s suggestion, we conclude that Brightwell correctly states Indiana law regarding priority rights when a foreclosing mortgagee sells the property to a third party. We hold that while Countrywide’s mortgage lien was preserved after it acquired title to the property via sheriff’s sale, Countrywide’s right to assert the mortgage against CSB was extinguished upon subsequent transfer of the property to FNMA and, thus, the mortgage-assertion right did not pass to FNMA. When property is transferred for value or resold to a third party, that party cannot then assert what was formerly a superior mortgage lien position against the judgment lien. Rather, the third party takes the property subject to the valid judgment lien. This is fair and just.[4] Accordingly, Countrywide’s attempt at strict foreclosure fails as a matter of law.

Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Countrywide and FNMA. We remand to the trial court with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of CSB on Countrywide’s complaint for strict foreclosure and also to enter summary judgment in favor of CSB on its complaint to foreclose judgment lien against FNMA and the Steuben County Treasurer and all other remedies consistent with this opinion.
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[4] We feel compelled to state the obvious. All of this could have been avoided had Countrywide conducted a thorough title search of the property prior to the original foreclosure or had FNMA done the same prior to purchasing the property from Countrywide, as such searches surely would have revealed CSB’s properly recorded judgment lien. While Countrywide and FNMA fancy these mistakes as “technicalities,” they are significant when applying principles of equity.

In Oscar Guillen v. R.D.C. Mail Clerk, et al. , a 6-page opinion in a pro se appeal, Sr. Judge Sharpnack writes:
Plaintiff-Appellant Oscar Guillen appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his complaint against the Reception-Diagnostic Center (R.D.C.) mail clerk, the R.D.C. warden, and the Commissioner of the Department of Correction (collectively, “prison officials”). We reverse and remand for further proceedings. * * *

The prison officials in this case have promulgated a rule regarding the “disposition of incoming correspondence.” (Exhibit E to Guillen’s complaint; Appellant’s App. at 11). The rule states, “If the offender’s name, identification number or housing unit is not included in the address on incoming correspondence, the facility shall make a reasonable attempt to deliver the correspondence in as timely manner as possible.” Id. We find it difficult to believe the Lake County court failed to place Guillen’s name upon the correspondence sent to him at the R.D.C. We hold that Guillen’s complaint set forth a set of facts which may allow him to recover damages from the named defendants because they negligently or deliberately refused to follow R.D.C. rules and interfered with Guillen’s constitutional right to pursue his Lake County claim. The complaint is sufficient to require the prison officials to respond thereto.

Upon our order, the State Attorney General has filed a brief in this appeal. The State first argues that the appeal should be dismissed because Guillen failed to make a cogent argument. Our review of the notice of complaint disclosed a somewhat unfocussed, but cogent, argument that necessitated our order that the State respond.

The State further argues that Guillen is trying to litigate the Lake County case in the action filed in Hendricks County. As our statement of facts reveals, this is not so.

Finally, the State cites Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 131 L.Ed.2d 999 (1996) for the proposition that the State need not enable the prisoner to litigate effectively once in court. The State reads too much into Lewis, which holds that a court interferes with a State’s political branches when it attempts to micro-manage prison procedures. Id. at 350. Lewis also holds that courts may protect a prisoner from the prison’s active interference with a lawsuit. Id.

We conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing Guillen’s complaint for failure to state a claim. Thus, we reverse and remand with instructions that the prison officials be required to answer.

In Stonington Insurance Company v. Wiley Williams, an 18-page opinion, Chief Judge Baker's introductory summary cuts through a complicated fact situation:
Here, a Texas insurance company issued an insurance policy to a Wisconsin moving company through a Colorado broker and a California insurance services company. An Indiana company was added to the policy as an additional insured and received a certificate amending the policy to that effect. A truck driver for the Indiana company was injured in an accident caused by an uninsured motorist. The accident occurred just after the driver had connected his tractor to a trailer that was registered and garaged in Indiana and covered by the insurance policy at issue. Although many states have had contacts with the underlying insurance contract, we find that Indiana has the most intimate contacts and, consequently, that Indiana substantive law should apply herein. Likewise, we find that the Indiana uninsured motorist statute applies and requires the insurer to provide uninsured motorist coverage at the same limits as its liability coverage.
NFP civil opinions today (1):

Baker & Daniels, LLP, et al. v. Coachmen Industries, Inc., et al. (NFP) - "Upon appeal, Baker & Daniels claims that the trial court abused its discretion in reinstating the St. Joseph Circuit Court action. In making this claim, Baker & Daniels argues that the action was dismissed due to attorney neglect and that, pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(1), reinstatement following dismissal on this ground is prohibited after one year has passed; that no “exceptional circumstances” justified reinstatement; that Coachmen failed to establish the necessary element that its claim was meritorious; and that, in light of the “significant interest” in finality for this litigation, Coachmen cannot demonstrate that dismissal amounts to an injustice. * * *

"Having concluded that this action was properly reinstated pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(8), and having rejected Baker & Daniels's challenges to the legitimacy of reinstatement on that ground, we affirm the decision of the trial court permitting reinstatement of the instant action."

NFP criminal opinions today (5):

Anthony Scott v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Darrell S. Aubuchon v. State of Indiana (NFP)

William James Wise v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Thomas Huffine v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Shaum M. Locke v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Posted by Marcia Oddi on March 5, 2010 12:04 PM
Posted to Ind. App.Ct. Decisions