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Thursday, March 11, 2010

Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals issues 5 today (and 5 NFP)

For publication opinions today (5):

In Heather L. Smitson v. Klinten M. Craig, a 4-page opinion, Judge Bailey writes:

H.S. (“Mother”) gave birth to K.C. out-of-wedlock in the State of Indiana and was thus the custodial parent pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-14-13-1. Absent any adjudication of custody, K.M.C. (“Father”) removed K.C. from Indiana to Alabama and later to Mississippi. When Mother located Father several years later and filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in Perry Circuit Court, Father moved to dismiss, claiming that Mississippi had become K.C.’s home state and the proper state to adjudicate custody under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (“the UCCJA”). The trial court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate K.C.’s custody, in deference to Mississippi, and refused to issue a writ. Mother now appeals. We reverse and remand.
In Jean V. Poulard v. LaPorte Co. Election Board, et al. , a 7-page opinion, Judge Crone writes:
Jean V. Poulard, pro se, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for relief from final judgment. While Poulard presents several issues for our review, the dispositive issue in this case involves the residency of Poulard’s opponent in an election that Poulard in fact won. Despite winning the election, Poulard has continued to challenge his former opponent’s residency and to litigate this matter against the LaPorte County Election Board and Clerk of the Court Robert J. Behler (collectively, the “Election Board”). We conclude that the dispositive issue is now and has long been moot and, thus, we dismiss Poulard’s appeal. However, because we find this appeal frivolous, we remand to the trial court pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 66(E) to award appellate damages, which may include attorney’s fees, in favor of the Election Board. * * *

While we are cognizant of the chilling effect that an award of appellate damages can have on litigants, this case is an example of when a chilling effect is necessary to put an end to the matter. Poulard has maintained this cause of action in a manner calculated to require the needless expenditure of time and resources by the Election Board, the trial court, and this Court. In short, Poulard’s appeal was brought in bad faith and for purposes of harassment. For these reasons, we remand to the trial court for a determination of appellate damages to which the Election Board may be entitled pursuant to Appellate Rule 66(E). Dismissed and remanded.

Kevin Taylor v. State of Indiana is a 21-page, 2-1 opinion, with the majority ruling: "Kevin Taylor appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Taylor raises two issues for our review, one of which is dispositive: whether the post-conviction court erred when it found that Taylor had not received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We reverse and remand for a new trial."

Elmer D. Baker v. State of Indiana - "Elmer D. Baker appeals his two class A felony child molesting convictions and one class C felony child molesting conviction. We affirm."

In Dannie Ray Runyon v. State of Indiana, a 14-page opinion, Judge Vaidik writes:

Ray Runyon was sentenced to a suspended sentence of eight years and placed on probation with several conditions. Runyon later violated his probation by failing to pay child support. Runyon now appeals the revocation of his probation and imposition of six years of his previously-suspended eight-year sentence. We hold that when revoking a defendant’s probation for failing to support his or her dependents, the defendant bears the burden of proving that he or she was unable to provide support pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3(f). Based on the record in this case, we conclude that Runyon has failed to prove that he had the inability to provide support and therefore the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking his probation. We also conclude that, given the multiple chances Runyon has been given to pay support, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing him to six years. We therefore affirm.
NFP civil opinions today (1):

Adoption of M.V.; S.S. v. G.R. and D.R. (NFP) - "S.S., the biological mother of M.M.V., appeals the probate court’s ruling that her consent to the adoption of M.M.V. by G.R. and D.R. (“the Guardians”) is not required. We affirm.

"Issue. S.S. presents a sole issue for review: whether there is sufficient evidence to support the probate court’s decision to dispense with her consent to M.M.V.’s adoption, pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-19-9-8(2)(A)-(B), which obviates the necessity of consent by a parent who, when able to do so, for at least one year, has failed to significantly communicate with or provide for the care and support of her child who is in the custody of another person."

NFP criminal opinions today (4):

Darren V. Rogers v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Nathan D. Hawkins v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Jason E. Pressley v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Robert McFarland v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Posted by Marcia Oddi on March 11, 2010 11:56 AM
Posted to Ind. App.Ct. Decisions