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Thursday, March 04, 2010
Ind. Decisions - Supreme Court decides one today
In Eric P. Sibbing v. Amanda N. Cave, a 15-page, 5-0 opinion (with a separate concurring opinion), Justice Dickson writes:
Following a plaintiff's verdict in this automobile rear-end collision personal injury case, the defendant appealed, claiming trial court error in (a) permitting the plaintiff to testify about what she was told by her treating physician and her own beliefs about the cause of her pain, and (b) excluding medical necessity evidence from the defendant's expert witness. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Sibbing v. Cave, 901 N.E.2d 1155 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). We granted transfer and affirm, holding that some of the challenged medical testimony of the plaintiff was improper-ly admitted but that the resulting error does not require reversal, and that the defendant's evidence regarding medical necessity was properly excluded. * * *In summary, we hold that the phrase "reasonable and necessary," as a qualification for the damages recoverable by an injured party, means (1) that the amount of medical expense claimed must be reasonable, (2) that the nature and extent of the treatment claimed must be necessary in the sense that it proximately resulted from the wrongful conduct of another, and (3) the rule in Whitaker is a correct application of the "scope of liability" component of proximate cause.
In the present case, the defendant challenges the exclusion of evidence from his medical expert challenging the medical necessity of Dr. Saquib's nerve conduction studies at Priority 1 Medical and the "passive care" treatment provided more than four weeks after the collision, first from Priority 1 Medical and later under Dr. Sheppard at Castleton Chiropractic. The defendant does not assert that such treatment lacks causation in fact, that is, that plaintiff failed to establish that, but for the collision, the challenged treatment would not have occurred. Instead, the defendant disputes the medical judgment of the plaintiff's medical providers in choosing to administer the questioned studies and treatment. This he may not do. The trial court was correct to exclude the proffered evidence, and the Court of Appeals properly applied Whitaker to affirm the trial court's decision.
Conclusion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Sullivan, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur. Shepard, C.J., concurs in result with separate opinion [that concludes] But the breadth of today’s ruling will lead future judges and juries to work injustices at the very moment when judgment is most needed to hold to account providers at the edge of reasonably necessary treatment, or beyond it. Today’s “Sibbing rule” insulates sharp practices from scrutiny, which is why I decline to join in.
Posted by Marcia Oddi on March 4, 2010 04:27 PM
Posted to Ind. Sup.Ct. Decisions