Since our last posting of Indiana Supreme Court decisions, the Court has released three opinions online, all dated Jan. 29, 2004.
State of Indiana v. Robert Bulington (1/29/04 IndSCt) [Criminal Law & Procedure]
Sullivan, Justice
The police asked a Meijer Superstore to report every customer who bought three or more packages of cold medicine. Acting on such a report, the police stopped and searched defendant Robert Bulington's truck and discovered various other substances used to produce methamphetamine. He was charged with the crime of “Possession of Precursors of Methamphetamine.” We affirm the trial judge's decision that there was insufficient evidence to create the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify stopping defendant's truck. * * * Dickson and Rucker, JJ., concur. Boehm, J., dissents with separate opinion in which Shepard, C.J., joins:Chad E. Vicory v. State of Indiana (1/29/04 IndSCt) [Criminal Law & Procedure]As the majority notes, we review these reasonable suspicion determinations de novo. Under that standard, I have no trouble finding that the information supplied by the Meijer store employees provided the officers with grounds for reasonable suspicion that a crime was afoot. The police were told that two men lingered in front of the cold remedy section of the store where one finds products containing ephedrine, a widely known ingredient of methamphetamine. Each selected the maximum number of packages that the store is to sell to one customer without notifying law enforcement. The two then separated and checked out individually. They are then observed emptying the pills into bags of loose pills. Of common human activities of which I am aware, I can think of nothing these actions suggest except preparation to cook these pills into some broth. It seems to me that the police had a moral certainty, not just reasonable suspicion, that they had some unregulated pharmaceutical manufacturers on their hands. I would reverse and remand for trial.
Shepard, C.J., joins.
This case deals with "the right of allocution." The Court holds that the right extends to include probation revocation hearings.
Indiana Department of Natural Resources and Larry D. Macklin v. Newton County, Indiana (1/29/04 IndSCt) [Constitutional Law; Administrative Law]
Boehm, Justice
The Court here reverses the judgment of the trial court in this important opinion. Because the trial court held a state statute unconstitutional, this appeal was taken directly to this court pursuant to Appellate Rule 4(A)(1)(b):
Newton County adopted two ordinances purporting to impose requirements on purchases of land in the County by government agencies. The trial court found that the acquisition of land by the Department of Natural Resources violated the ordinances and set aside the transaction. The trial court also held unconstitutional the Game Bird Habitat Act, which gave the agency the authority to purchase the land. We hold that the ordinances are invalid exercises of county authority and that the Game Bird Habitat Act is constitutional.After finding that the County had standing to raise the issue of the constitutionaility of the Game Bird Habitat Act, the Court states [important citations mostly omitted here]:
In order to constitute a valid delegation of authority to a state agency, legislation must provide sufficient standards to guide the agency in its exercise of that authority. Newton County argues that the Act fails this test. First, the County contends the terms “willing seller” and “game bird habitat” lack sufficient definition. Second, the County points out that the terms have not been refined by any regulations. Third, the County points out that the legislature failed to provide any specific procedures for acquiring game bird habitats.Posted by Marcia Oddi at February 2, 2004 04:24 PMWe do not agree that the legislature must supply more specific definitions for the terms “willing seller” and “game bird habitat” to guide the agency. To be sure, statutory terms must be understandable, but they need not be rigorously precise. Newton County sets out a parade of horribles that it contends may constitute examples of a “willing seller” under the statute. * * * Newton County points to no evidence whatsoever that DNR has wasted public funds, purchased land for wrongful uses, or coerced residents into selling their land. More importantly, there is no such evidence as to the Brandt sale. To be sure, there may be litigable issues on the fringes of the term “willing seller”, but there is no doubt that Brandt is one. He approached DNR and proposed the sale.
The term “game bird” is defined by statute to mean pheasant, quail, grouse, wild turkey, and Hungarian partridge. Ind. Code § 14-22-8-2 (1998). A particular bird is a “game bird” or it is not, and a “potential habitat” is a place where a game bird can live. We see no need to define the terms with any greater specificity. The birds are identified with precision. “Habitat” as we take it, means these creatures may reasonably be expected to occupy the site in the course of their natural activity. “Game Bird Habitat” may present some issues if, as the County posits, DNR attempts to use this statute to buy an asphalt parking lot. Courts can deal with these if they occur. The terms are sufficiently specific to have content. This regulatory framework may be less than wholly precise, but perfection has never been required of administrative bodies. Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 643 N.E.2d at 340.We also find unpersuasive Newton County’s argument that the terms “willing seller” and “game bird habitat” need definition by DNR regulations. Newton County cites the following passage in Indiana Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt.: “Such terms get precision from the knowledge and experience of men whose duty it is to administer the Statutes, and then such Statutes become reasonably certain guides in carrying out the will and intent of the Legislature.” 643 N.E.2d at 340. We do not take this to require DNR to promulgate rules or guidelines to interpret statutory terms. Rather it merely acknowledges that regulations may fulfill that purpose. If no ambiguity exists within the statute itself an agency may determine if “facts or circumstances exist upon which the law makes or intends to make its own action depend” so long as the agency does not make the law itself.