Terry Huber v. State of Indiana (4/6/04 IndCtApp) [Criminal Law & Procedure]
Fort Wayne Lodge, LLC v. EBH Corporation (4/6/04 IndCtApp) [Contracts; Civil Procedure]
Mukesh I. Desai v. Sherry L. Croy (4/6/04 IndCtApp) [Civil Procedure]
B.J.B. v. State of Indiana (4/6/04 IndCtApp) [Criminal Law & Procedure]
Barnes, Judge
B.B. appeals the juvenile court’s order directing him to register as a sex offender with the local sheriff. We reverse. * * *Before a juvenile who has been adjudicated delinquent for committing a sex offense may be ordered to publicly register as a sex offender, a court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the juvenile is likely to commit another sex offense. See Ind. Code § 5-2-12-4(b)(3). We have consistently construed this statute as requiring an evidentiary hearing before a juvenile may be ordered to register as a sex offender. * * *
We reverse the order requiring B.B. to register as a sex offender. Our decision today would not preclude the State from successfully requesting that B.B. be placed on the sex offender registry, provided it presents evidence at a hearing that establishes by clear and convincing evidence that B.B. is likely to commit another sex offense. Unless and until that happens, however, B.B.’s name must be removed from the sex offender registry.
Reversed.
KIRSCH, C.J., and FRIEDLANDER, J., concur
Patrick Fitzgerald v. State of Indiana (4/6/04 IndCtApp) [Criminal Law & Procedure]
William Roberts v. State of Indiana (4/6/04 IndCtApp) [Workers' Compensation; Asbestos]
Carl R. Denton, Jr. v. State of Indiana (4/6/04 IndCtApp) [Criminal Law & Procedure]
Baker, Judge
Today we hold that the fact that the vehicle the defendant was driving had what appeared to be a broken rear window did not, without more, afford police a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle was stolen so as to justify an investigatory stop. Appellant-defendant Carl R. Denton, Jr., appeals his conviction for Operating a Motor Vehicle After Having Been Adjudged a Habitual Traffic Violator, a class D felony. Specifically, Denton challenges the denial of his motion to suppress on the grounds that the arresting police officer improperly stopped his vehicle and further argues that the State failed to show that his driver’s license was validly suspended in accordance with Indiana Code section 9-30-10-5. Inasmuch as we conclude that the traffic stop was unlawful and therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court on that basis, we need not address Denton’s argument regarding the suspension of his driver’s license. * * *Posted by Marcia Oddi at April 6, 2004 03:14 PMMajor Werden obviously observed the window in terms of crime, but of course a window can also be accidentally broken. This court is deferential to police officer training and experience, and we certainly recognize that a trained officer can properly act on a suspicion that would elude an untrained eye. However, in this case, Major Werden’s stated rationale for stopping this vehicle would support stopping any car at all with a broken window. In short, there does not appear, in the record before us, to have been an assessment based on training or experience that this particular broken window indicated that the vehicle was stolen.[ftnote]
In light of these circumstances, we must conclude that the stop was based upon nothing more than an unparticularized suspicion and, therefore, Major Werden lacked the reasonable suspicion or probable cause necessary to justify his actions in stopping the vehicle. Therefore, the motion to suppress should have been granted, and the judgment of the trial court is reversed.[ftnote]
NAJAM, J. and RILEY, J., concur.[ftnote] While a split of authority exists with respect to this issue, we reject the view advanced by several other jurisdictions recognizing that a broken automobile window alone is sufficient to provide a reasonable suspicion for the stop. [cites omitted]
[ftnote] Although we need not address Denton’s sufficiency of the evidence argument in light of our reversal on this issue, it is interesting to note that our supreme court has declared that an incomplete or untimely suspension notice sent by the BMV or the failure to outline the opportunity for judicial review in an initial HTV suspension notice will not warrant an automatic reversal of a suspension. See Groce v. State, 778 N.E.2d 785, 786-87 (Ind. 2002); State v. Hammond, 761 N.E.2d 812, 815 (Ind. 2002); Stewart v. State, 721 N.E.2d 876, 879-80 (Ind. 1999). In light of these cases, the State need only show that the defendant had been driving and that he knew he was an HTV, thereby nullifying the notice requirements set forth in Indiana Code section 9-30-10-5. * * *