In Re Adoption of Infant Female Fitz (4/12/04 IndCtApp) [Family Law]Kirsch, Chief Judge
Here, the parties stipulated that Rudd failed to give notice within the thirty day time period. Accordingly, his consent to the adoption of Infant Female Fitz was irrevocably implied. * * *Burd Management, LLC v. State of Indiana (4/12/04 IndCtApp) [Condemnation]Rudd also argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike the Pritts’ appearance and vacate the adoption decree. However, IC 31-19-14-3 provides that a person who is served with notice of an adoption is prohibited from contesting the adoption more than thirty days after the date of the service of the notice and may not otherwise challenge an adoption decree. Again, Rudd was served with notice of the adoption, but failed to raise his challenge within the thirty-day period. Accordingly, he may not now challenge the adoption decree. The trial court did not err in denying his motion.
Affirmed.
FRIEDLANDER, J., and BARNES, J., concur.
The trial court erroneously granted summary judgment in favor of the State after concluding, as a matter of law, that the State, through INDOT, was not required to prove that an offer was made prior to filing a condemnation action. The evidence presented before us shows that the appraisals were not attached to the affidavits of the appraisers. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the State. We remand this case to the trial court with instructions to determine, by summary proceedings or after evidentiary hearings, whether a good faith offer based on fair market value was made by the State for all of the land appropriated from Burd.Sandra E. Beike v. Walter C. Beike (4/12/04 IndCtApp) [Family Law]
Sandra Beike appeals the trial court’s order granting Walter Beike’s Motion for Relief from Judgment which adjusted the dissolution decree to account for a decline in value of Walter’s pension benefits. We affirm. * * *Samuel Hoggatt v. State of Indiana (4/12/04 IndCtApp) [Criminal Law & Procedure]Here, as in Case, Sandra has not alleged that the decline in the value of Walter’s pension was caused by or contributed to by any of Walter’s actions. Rather, the value of the pension plan declined due to National Steel’s bankruptcy. Therefore, as in Case, absent express language to the contrary, the risks and losses associated with the pension plan should be borne by both parties as their respective interests were allocated by the trial court. * * *
Conclusion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted relief from the decree to ensure that both Sandra and Walter would bear the risks and the rewards of the pension plan. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
SULLIVAN, J., and RATLIFF, SrJ., concur.
Samuel Hoggatt appeals the trial court’s grant of the State’s motion to correct sentence. In light of the Indiana Supreme Court’s recent opinions on motions to correct sentences, which narrowly confine such motions to claims apparent from the face of the sentencing judgment, we conclude that Hoggatt’s sentence is not facially erroneous and therefore reverse the trial court. * * *Posted by Marcia Oddi at April 12, 2004 03:13 PMIn reaching this conclusion, we make some observations. In arriving at its holding in Robinson, the supreme court was faced with the factual scenario where the defendant filed the motion to correct sentence in the trial court. Here, however, the State filed the motion to correct sentence in the trial court. This distinction makes a difference because if the thirty-day deadline for filing a motion to correct error or notice of appeal has passed and the sentence is not facially erroneous, then the defendant still has the opportunity to challenge his sentence through post-conviction relief proceedings. The State does not have this same opportunity. See Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1, §1(a) (providing that the remedy of post-conviction relief is available to “[a]ny person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime by a court of this state[.]”). This creates a difficult situation for the State. If the sentencing defect is erroneous on its face, then the State has an unrestricted amount of time to file a motion to correct sentence. However, if the sentencing defect is discovered by resorting to other matters in or extrinsic to the record – which, presumably, makes that defect more difficult to discover than a facially erroneous one – then the State must take action within thirty days or else forfeit its right to challenge an erroneous sentence. Nevertheless, our supreme court has instructed, “As to sentencing claims not facially apparent, the motion to correct sentence is an improper remedy. Such claims may be raised only on direct appeal and, where appropriate, by post-conviction proceedings.” Robinson, 2004 WL 434202 at *3. Because the thirty-day deadline has long since passed, the State is left without a remedy to challenge Hoggatt’s sentence.
Reversed.
SHARPNACK, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.