George Carson v. State of Indiana (4/30/04 IndCtApp) [Criminal Law & Procedure]
Bailey, Judge
Appellant-Defendant George Allen Carson (“Carson”) appeals the trial court’s determination that he was guilty but mentally ill for the attempted murder of his wife, Tricia Carson (“Wife”). We affirm.In the Matter of the Supervised Administration of the Estate of Kellyn R. Andrews (4/30/04 IndCtApp) [Estates & Trusts]Issues. Carson raises two issues, which we restate as: [1] Whether the trial court’s determination that Carson was guilty but mentally ill was contrary to law because the evidence demonstrated that he was insane at the time of the attempted murder; and [2] Whether the Indiana Supreme Court’s holding in Barany v. State, 658 N.E.2d 60 (Ind. 1995), precluded Carson from proving that he was not responsible by reason of insanity at the time of the offense. * * *
On March 23, 2004, our supreme court decided [Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1148 (Ind. 2004)], wherein it held that a finder of fact is entitled to decide whether to credit the opinions of experts on insanity, even in the absence of lay witness testimony. Indeed, as previously mentioned, the Thompson court found sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s guilty but mentally ill determination when the evidence revealed that: (1) the defendant removed only items belonging to her from the house that she unlawfully entered; and (2) the police officers who stopped the defendant following the incident believed that she was lucid enough to proceed about her business. Although Thompson did not define the episodic parameters regarding what constitutes probative non-medical evidence, it demonstrates that the Indiana Supreme Court has revisited and reaffirmed its holding in Barany. Accordingly, we decline Carson’s invitation to disregard supreme court precedent. Affirmed.
NAJAM, J., and ROBB, J., concur.
"Given the sensitive nature and the specific facts of this case, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the equal division of K.A.’s remains between Mother and Father. First, K.A.’s wishes allowed for the division of her ashes by the direction to spread them in different locales. Second, by acceding to such wishes, Mother also allows for a division of the remains. Moreover, neither IC 25-15-9-18 nor IC 23-14-31-26 distinguishes between a custodial and non-custodial parent. Finally, the practice of dividing the remains of a decedent among the survivors is common and acceptable in the funeral service industry. Susan French of French Funeral Home testified that the funeral industry has developed a market around the idea of dividing ashes. Specifically, French testified that memento urns or keepsakes have been marketed to preserve divided ashes for surviving family members."
Reeder Associates II v. Chicago Belle LTD., et al. (4/30/04 IndCtApp) [Attorney Fees]
Bailey, Judge
[H]ere, the propriety of the trial court’s award turns on the interpretation of a statute, i.e., Indiana Code Section 6-1.1-25-13. * * * Because Owner commenced the equivalent of an action to quiet title without first tendering the requisite check to Purchaser, it has not complied with the prerequisites necessary to invoke the attorney fees provision of Indiana Code Section 6-1.1-25-13(b). As such, the statute is inapplicable to the case at bar and the trial court erred by granting attorney fees and costs, in the amount of $49,348.76, to Owner. * * * For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s award of attorney fees to Owner. Reversed.Betty Bridges v. Metromedia Steakhouse Company, et al. (4/30/04 IndCtApp) [Tort]
RILEY, J., and DARDEN, J., concur.
Betty Bridges sued Metromedia Steakhouse Company, L.P., d/b/a Ponderosa Steak House (“Metromedia”), after she sustained a burn injury while visiting one of Metromedia’s restaurants. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Bridges, but also assessed her forty percent comparative fault. She appeals and presents the following issues for our review: 1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed an insurance adjustor to testify regarding the extent of Bridges’ injury based upon her observation during the parties’ mediation. 2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed that testimony despite Metromedia’s failure to identify the insurance adjustor as a witness prior to trial. We affirm.Posted by Marcia Oddi at April 30, 2004 02:09 PM
BAKER, J., and MAY, J., concur.