This 5/15/04 AP story in the Grand Rapids Press reports:
LANSING -- Michigan property owners who live along the Great Lakes shoreline have exclusive access up to the water's edge, the state appellate court said in a decision published Friday.The case is Glass v. Goeckel (5/13/04), which begins:The unanimous decision could affect where people are allowed to walk along private, waterfront property they don't own. The issue has been a contentious one in recent years because of the Great Lakes' relatively low water levels.
The Michigan Court of Appeals ruled a person has the right to walk along private property as long as they remain in the water. But where dry land begins, the property owners have exclusive rights. * * *
"We have said all along that we own up to the water's edge, and this decision confirms for modern times what the courts have repeatedly said since 1930 and before," said Ernie Krygier, president of Save Our Shoreline Inc., a nonprofit group committed to preserving waterfront areas.
Krygier's organization said the appellate court decision calls into question the assertion by the state Department of Environmental Quality that the boundary between public and private land is the ordinary high-water mark.
DEQ Deputy Director Skip Pruss disagrees. He said the ruling reinforces law that says property owners have exclusive rights up to the water's edge.
But the decision does not change the fact that the state holds title to the land up to the high-water mark, he said. That prevents property owners from interfering with public use of navigable waters, Pruss said.
Plaintiff, a neighbor of defendants, asserts that as a member of the general public, she “has the right to navigate and walk across those portions of the shore and waters of Lake Huron lying below and lakeward of the natural ordinary high-water mark, free from obstruction or interference by defendants.” Defendants argue that their property rights extend to the waters’ edge, and that plaintiff could not walk beyond the waters’ edge and onto their property. The trial court held that plaintiff was entitled to freely traverse the “shore of Lake Huron lying below and lakewards of the natural ordinary high water mark as specifically defined in MCL 324.32502.” We conclude otherwise, and therefore reverse the trial court’s order granting plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition and remand for entry of an order granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition.Posted by Marcia Oddi at May 17, 2004 11:17 AM