Forty-One Associates, LLC v. Bluefield Associates (6/1/04 IndCtApp) [Real Estate; Banking]
Baker, Judge
We find that the trial court did not err in finding that Forty-One, as the fee simple owner of the property, bears the risk of loss as to payment of the mortgage. Additionally, we find that the Assignment did not release Bluefield from liability but that the Agreement and the K-Mart lease did. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.Alicia Crabtree, et al. v. Jackie Crabtree (6/2/04 IndCtApp) [Insurance]
FRIEDLANDER, J., and BAILEY, J., concur.
Appellants raise two issues, which we reorder and restate as: Whether the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing Appellants’ claim for punitive damages; and Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying their motion to correct error because Allstate’s subrogation rights should have been reduced by a pro rata share of the costs incurred in pursuing and obtaining a judgment against the tortfeasor, pursuant to Indiana Code Section 34-53-1-2. * * *Douglas Downing, et al. v. G. Douglass Owens (6/2/04 IndCtApp) [Real Estate; Property]For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s dismissal of Appellants’ claim for punitive damages and the trial court’s order denying Appellants’ motion to correct error. We remand to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded with instructions.
RILEY, J., and DARDEN, J., concur.
Appellants-Defendants Douglas and Mary Downing and Connie and Jeff McKay, individually and d/b/a Grandma’s Treasures (collectively, “Appellants”) appeal the trial court’s grant of a prescriptive easement to Appellees-Plaintiffs G. Douglass Owens, Mahoney, Heineman and Company, P.C. (individually, “Company”), Dale Judy d/b/a Donnie’s Old Oak Tavern Corporation, Morris and Edith McCurty, and John Doe, business invitee of businesses located on east side of 100 Block of Pendleton Avenue and north side of East 100 Block of North Pendleton Avenue (collectively, “Appellees”). We reverse.Mark Maser, et al. v. Hance Hicks (6/2/04 IndCtApp) [Family Law]Issue. Appellants raise one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court erred by granting a prescriptive easement to Appellees because Appellees failed to establish that their use of the property at issue was actual, hostile, open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted, and adverse for a period of twenty years under a claim of right or with Appellants’ knowledge and acquiescence. * * *
For the foregoing reasons [Ed. - which involve a number of differing fact situations, and include over a dozen factual footnotes] we reverse the trial court’s grant of a prescriptive easement to Appellees. Reversed.
RILEY, J., and DARDEN, J., concur.
Mark Maser (“Father”) and his daughter, K.M., appeal from the trial court’s order granting grandparent visitation to K.M.’s maternal step-grandfather, Hance Hicks (“Step-Grandfather”). Father raises three issues, one of which we find dispositive and restate as, whether the trial court’s order granting Step-Grandfather visitation with K.M. is clearly erroneous because Step-Grandfather lacked standing as a “grandparent” under the Grandparent Visitation Act to petition for grandparent visitation rights. We reverse and remand. * * *[More] The 6/3/04 Fort Wayne Journal Gazette has this story, which begins: "The Indiana Court of Appeals ruled Wednesday in a Noble County case that step-grandparents cannot sue for visitation rights to their grandchildren."For purposes of the Grandparent Visitation Act, Ind. Code § 31-9-2-77 (1998) defines “maternal or paternal grandparent” as including: “(1) the adoptive parent of the child’s parent; (2) the parent of the child’s adoptive parent; and (3) the parent of the child’s parent.” Here, Step-Grandfather is the step-father of K.M.’s mother; thus, he does not fit into any of the categories in the statutory definition of a grandparent entitled to petition for grandparent visitation rights. The Grandparent Visitation Act applies only to requests for visitation made by grandparents. We decline to expand the plain meaning of the statute by including step-grandparents as “grandparents” for purposes of the application of the Grandparent Visitation Act. Because he is not a “grandparent” as defined by I.C. § 31-9-2-77, Step-Grandfather did not have standing under the Grandparent Visitation Act to petition for grandparent visitation rights with K.M. Therefore, the trial court’s order granting Step-Grandfather grandparent visitation rights with K.M. is clearly erroneous. See, e.g., Hammons [v. Jenkins-Griffith, 764 N.E.2d 303 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)] at 305-306 (holding that great-grandparents were not entitled to petition for grandparent visitation rights because Grandparent Visitation Act applied only to “grandparents”).
For the forgoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the trial court awarding grandparent visitation rights to Step-Grandfather. Reversed and remanded.
DARDEN, J. and ROBB, J. concur
[Update 6/4/04] This story today in the Indianapolis Star is titled "Stepgrandparents not entitled to visitation: Judges can't issue visitation orders for stepgrandkids, state appeals panel rules."
Posted by Marcia Oddi at June 2, 2004 04:18 PM