Aaron G. Fowler v. State of Indiana (6/14/04 IndCtApp) [Criminal Law & Procedure; Constitutional Law]
Barnes, Judge
The issue before us is whether the trial court erroneously allowed a police officer to recount statements made by the victim at the time of Fowler’s arrest. * * *Hershel Hammon v. State of Indiana (6/14/04 IndCtApp) [Criminal Law & Procedure; Constitutional Law]Although we have concluded that A.R.’s statements to Officer Decker fall under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, that does not end our analysis today, given a recent and substantial change in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence announced by the United States Supreme Court while this case was pending, and which we have analyzed in another case decided today. [Hammon, see next case] We incorporate that analysis here * * *
A domestic violence victim should not be placed in the situation of being intimidated not only by the aggressor, but also by the State and its representatives. Although we understand the frustration experienced by the State when a victim refuses to testify, we note the large number of cases from this court and our supreme court delineating the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, the sufficiency of such evidence to support a domestic violence conviction, our presumption that a police officer will interview a victim shortly after a domestic violence incident, and our belief announced today that Crawford v. Washington should not substantially curtail the admission of excited utterances in these types of cases.
Conclusion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Officer Decker’s testimony relating A.R.’s statements made following the battery, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Crawford v. Washington [March 8, 2004]. We affirm Fowler’s conviction.
Affirmed.
MATHIAS, J., concurs.
CRONE, J., concurs in result with separate opinion:I agree with the majority’s conclusion that A.R.’s statements to Officer Decker fall under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting those statements. Nevertheless, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s determination that the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004), applies to the facts of this case. * * * The fallout from Justice Scalia’s “clarification” of the Confrontation Clause in Crawford will reverberate through the evidentiary landscape for some time to come and will create countless dilemmas for trial and appellate courts, but I do not believe that we are necessarily faced with that dilemma here. For that reason, I respectfully concur in result.
Hershel Hammon appeals his conviction for domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor. We affirm in part and reverse in part.Harold Donnegan v. State of Indiana (6/14/04 IndCtApp) [Criminal Law & Procedure]The issues before us are: whether the trial court erred by admitting into evidence statements made by the victim to the arresting officer; and whether the trial court erred in allowing Hammon’s $300.00 cash bond to be applied to administrative fees and to the costs of his representation by a public defender.* * *
Although we have concluded that A.H.’s statements to Officer Mooney fell under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, that does not end our analysis today, given a recent and substantial change in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence announced by the United States Supreme Court while this appeal was pending. Specifically, the Court held in March of this year that when the prosecution seeks to introduce a “testimonial” out-of-court statement into evidence against a criminal defendant, the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment requires two showings: (1) that the witness who made the statement is unavailable; and (2) that the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Crawford v. Washington, -- U.S. --, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1374 (2004). In reaching this holding, the Court squarely criticized and overruled Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S. Ct. 2531 (1980). Roberts had established the rule that hearsay statements made by an unavailable witness were admissible against a criminal defendant if the statement fell “within a firmly rooted hearsay exception” or otherwise bore “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”
Conclusion. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Officer Mooney’s testimony relating a statement made by the victim following the battery. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Crawford v. Washington does not change this result [because it is not a "testimonial statement - see opinion]. Therefore, we affirm Hammon’s conviction. However, we reverse the trial court’s order that Hammon’s cash bond be retained. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
KIRSCH, C.J., and FRIEDLANDER, J., concur.
Harold Donnegan appeals his convictions for dealing in cocaine, possession of cocaine, and possession of marijuana. Although we find one instance of misconduct by the prosecutor, none of the instances alleged by Donnegan placed him in a position of grave peril. However, because Donnegan simultaneously possessed the cocaine that supported the possession and dealing in cocaine convictions, we find that Indiana double jeopardy principles are violated; consequently, we reverse the possession of cocaine convictions. Additionally, we find that the evidence is sufficient to show that Donnegan constructively possessed the cocaine and marijuana because he lived in the residence where the drugs were found and the drugs were his. Because Donnegan had a sophisticated operation that was responsible for bringing large amounts of cocaine from Chicago to Tippecanoe County to sell and had prior convictions, we find that his forty-year sentence for dealing in cocaine is not inappropriate. * * *John P. Smith v. State of Indiana (6/14/04 IndCtApp) [Criminal Law & Procedure]
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
SHARPNACK, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.
"For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Smith’s convictions for conspiracy to commit dealing in methamphetamine as a class B felony, obstruction of justice as a class D felony, and resisting law enforcement with a vehicle as a class D felony."
Susan J. Mahl a/k/a Susan Scott v. Jim Aaron, et al. (6/14/04 IndCtApp) [Constitutional Law; Civil Procedure]
Vaidik, Judge
Susan Mahl (a/k/a Susan Scott), a South Carolina resident, appeals the trial court’s order allowing Jim Aaron to execute a judgment against individual retirement accounts (“IRAs”) that she opened in Indiana. We find that the trial court properly applied Indiana law to resolve the dispute and that as a non-domiciliary Mahl is not entitled to exempt her IRAs from execution under Indiana Code § 34-55-10-2(b)(6). Moreover, we find that Mahl waived her Equal Privileges and Immunities challenge to Indiana Code § 34-55-10-2(b)(6) and that her Full Faith and Credit challenge to that section fails. Finally, we find that Mahl does not have standing to challenge Indiana Code § 34-55-10-2(b)(6) based on South Carolina’s legitimate interests. Consequently, we affirm.United Consulting, et al. v. Board of Hancock County, et al. (6/14/04 IndCtApp) [Insurance]Mahl and Aaron were involved in a romantic relationship from 1998 until 2001. During this relationship, Mahl was the managing partner at the California law firm of Mahl Rehon Walworth & Roberts. While serving as the managing partner, Mahl embezzled nearly $750,000 from the firm. Mahl resigned from the firm in 1999, and she later moved to South Carolina, where she continues to reside. The firm subsequently changed its name to Rehon & Roberts. In January 2000, Rehon & Roberts filed a complaint for damages against Mahl in the Santa Clara County Superior Court in California, which alleged fraud and deceit, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and other related causes of action. On September 17, 2001, the Santa Clara County Court entered judgment against Scott in the amount of $1,039,834.91 plus attorneys’ fees and costs. Rehon & Roberts assigned this judgment to Aaron for purposes of collection.
Meanwhile, Mahl opened IRAs with John Nicklas at his office in LaPorte, Indiana, in March and August 2000, under the names Jeanne E. Ginther See footnote and Susan J. Mahl for the benefit of Susan J. Scott. Nicklas placed the investments with HD Vest Financial Services. Sometime after August 2001, Mahl changed her name to Susan Scott. * * *
Baker, Judge
Appellant-defendant United Consulting Engineers (UCE) appeals the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment in favor of appellee-plaintiff Board of Commissioners of Hancock County (County). Specifically, UCE raises five issues, which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court erred in finding that UCE was obligated to defend the County in this lawsuit and to provide the County with liability insurance. Finding that UCE was not required to defend the County for the County’s negligence and that the Agreement similarly did not require UCE to procure insurance for the County, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. * * *Posted by Marcia Oddi at June 14, 2004 02:39 PM
FRIEDLANDER, J., and BAILEY, J., concur.