Loretta Baca v. New Prime, Inc. (6/23/04 IndSCt) [Confict of Laws]
Shepard, Chief Justice
After an accident in eastern Indiana involving residents of multiple states, the ensuing litigation has necessitated deciding certain choice-of-law questions. Because we issued an important decision on choice of law while this case was pending, we remand for further consideration. * * *The Indiana Supreme Court's 3/31/04 decision in Simon v. United States is covered in this Indiana Law Blog entry.The trial court held that Indiana negligence law governed and granted New Prime summary judgment. Loretta appealed to the Indiana Court of Appeals, which affirmed. See Baca v. New Prime, Inc., 763 N.E.2d 1014 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). We granted transfer.
While this appeal has been pending, we have decided another choice-of-law case on certified questions from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Simon v. United States, 805 N.E.2d 798 (Ind. 2004). In the course of doing so, we re-affirmed our leading case on lex loci delecti, Hubbard Manufacturing Co. v. Greeson, 515 N.E.2d 1071 (Ind. 1987), and indicated that we had elected not to adopt the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971).
Also significant for purposes of this case, we considered for the first time whether Indiana choice-of-law doctrine embraces dépeçage, the process of applying separately the law of different states within the same case. We declined to adopt dépeçage, saying we would not “separately analyze and apply the law of different jurisdictions to issues within each claim” of a suit. Id. at 802.
This holding in Simon will not necessarily lead to a different resolution than the one reached by the trial court and the Court of Appeals in this case. The plaintiff argued and briefed this case in substantial reliance on the Restatement (Second), however, and neither party took into account the applicability or inapplicability of the doctrine of dépeçage. We think it appropriate to give the parties and those courts a chance to brief and consider the issues with benefit of our recent decision. Accordingly, we remand to the trial court for consideration in light of Simon v. United States.
Dickson, Sullivan, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.
John D. May v. State of Indiana (6/23/04 IndCtApp) [Criminal Law & Procedure]VAIDIK, Judge
John D. May appeals his conviction for burglary. Because the jury could have concluded that May broke and entered a building with intent to commit theft but did not commit theft, we conclude that May’s conviction for burglary and acquittal on theft are not inconsistent. Also, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support May’s conviction for burglary. However, because the trial court failed to follow statutory requirements when imposing a $750 public defender services fee, we remand this case with instructions to vacate the fee. * * *Delrick L. Dandridge v. State of Indiana (6/23/04 IndCtApp) [Criminal Law & Procedure]MATHIAS, JudgeBecause the trial court failed to follow the steps that must be taken before imposing a public defender services fee, we remand this case with instructions for the trial court to reverse its assessment of the $750 public defender services fee. On remand, if the trial court wishes to impose a public defender services fee, the court must follow the statutory requirements. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
SULLIVAN, J., and MAY, J., concur.
Delrick Dandridge (“Dandridge”) was convicted of Class A felony dealing in cocaine and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement in Tippecanoe Superior Court. He appeals and raises the following issues: I. Whether evidence obtained as a result of his arrest should be suppressed because the State failed to establish that there was an existing arrest warrant; and, II. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for dealing in cocaine. We affirm. * * *Danny F. Haggard v. State of Indiana (6/23/04 IndCtApp) [Criminal Law & Procedure]The evidence obtained from Dandridge’s lawful arrest and the search incident to his arrest was properly admitted at trial. Also, Dandridge’s Class A felony conviction for dealing in cocaine is supported by sufficient evidence. Affirmed.
SHARPNACK, J., and VAIDIK, J., concur.
Danny Haggard appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He presents one main issue for our review, whether he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. * * *Posted by Marcia Oddi at June 23, 2004 02:11 PMThe acts constituted one episode of criminal conduct, and there is no reason to conclude anything other than that restriction on consecutive sentences applies to convictions for the unlawful use of body armor. Thus, Haggard’s appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to present the issue, and the cause is remanded to the trial court to enter a sentence which conforms to the statutory restrictions. As a second issue pertaining to his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Haggard claims that his convictions for resisting law enforcement and battery resulting in injury violate the prohibitions against double jeopardy. Specifically, he claims that the convictions are both based upon the single act of biting Officer Sollars. * * * However, while the same type evidence was relied upon to prove both claims, the same evidence was not used because Officer Sollars testified that Haggard bit him twice and that the bites inflicted pain. Thus, there was no double jeopardy violation and Haggard’s appellate counsel could not be ineffective for failing to present the issue upon appeal.
The decision of the post-conviction court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this decision.
MAY, J., and VAIDIK, J., concur.