MCCORMICK, PAMELA v. WAUKEGAN SCHOOL (ND Ill.)
Before BAUER, COFFEY, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.PALMETTO PROPERTIES v. COUNTY OF DUPAGE (ND Ill.)
KANNE, Circuit Judge.
* * * The district court, ruling on a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion, dismissed the complaint without prejudice because Eron failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available under IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse. * * *Eron only seeks to recover for the arguably outrageous actions of Neterer, the physical education instructor. He does not allege any ongoing emotional difficulties that might be addressed through IDEA [Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400, et seq.]. After closely examining the “theory behind the grievance” in Eron’s complaint, we are convinced that it would be futile for Eron to exhaust the administrative process under the circumstances of this case because IDEA does not provide a remedy for his alleged injuries, which are non-educational in nature.
Before COFFEY, RIPPLE and KANNE, Circuit Judges.Posted by Marcia Oddi at July 7, 2004 12:39 PM
KANNE, Circuit Judge. This case raises a question about an award of attorney’s fees to a “prevailing party” under the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000). After the underlying claims, which challenged the constitutionality of both state and local adult entertainment zoning regulations, were disposed of through dismissals, partial summary judgments, a repeal of the relevant portion of the local statute, and a final dismissal for mootness, the district court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for attorney’s fees. For the following reasons, we affirm.I. Background. The issue on appeal can be succinctly stated: did the district court correctly award attorney’s fees to Palmetto as a “prevailing party” under 42 U.S.C. § 1988? However, “prevailing party” is a legal term of art, generally meaning a “party in whose favor a judgment is rendered . . . .” Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Vir. Dept. of Health and Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001) (quotation omitted). In Buckhannon, the Supreme Court demonstrated that, although the issue and definition can be pithily put, in order to determine whether an award of attorney’s fees would be appropriate, a meticulous analysis of the “particular judgments and orders entered in a case” is necessary. * * *
III. Conclusion. In sum, the district court’s $49,175.00 award of attorney’s fees to Palmetto was equitable, efficiency-promoting, a logical development in Buckhannon jurisprudence, and applied a common-sense understanding of a “judgment on the merits.” For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the award of attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.