Robert Howard v. U.S. Signcrafters (7/9/04 IndCtApp) [Worker's Compensation]
MATHIAS, Judge
Robert Howard (“Howard”) appeals the Worker’s Compensation Board’s (“the Board”) decision that Howard should take nothing by way of his application for adjustment of claim. The Board specifically found that Howard was an independent contractor and not an employee of U.S. Signcrafters under the Indiana Worker’s Compensation Act (“the Act”). Howard appeals raising two issues: Whether the Board erred when it determined that he was not an employee of U.S. Signcrafters; and, Whether the Board erred when it did not address whether Howard was eligible for benefits under Indiana Code section 22-3-2-14. * * *Arturo Aguilar v. State of Indiana (7/9/04 IndCtApp) [Criminal Law & Procedure]Howard controlled the details of his sign removal work, provided his own trucks, and operated Custom Signs, whose regular business included sign removal. Furthermore, he was never on U.S. Signcrafters’ payroll and the work was to be performed over the span of four nights. Based upon the Board’s factual findings, and applying the ten-factor test as set out in Expressway, we conclude that Howard was an independent contractor and not an employee of U.S. Signcrafters at the time he was injured. * * *
Howard was the owner of a sole proprietorship called Custom Signs. While sole proprietors may elect to make themselves employees of their sole proprietorships under Indiana Code section 22-3-6-1(b)(4), Howard did not do so. Howard failed to maintain worker’s compensation coverage for his business. As a result, he was unable to elect to treat himself as an employee for worker’s compensation purposes. Howard is therefore not an employee of Custom Signs under the worker’s compensation statute, and Indiana Code section 22-3-2-14 does not apply to his injury. The Full Board properly concluded that Howard’s injury was not compensable under the Worker’s Compensation Act.
Conclusion. The Board properly concluded that Howard was not an employee under the Worker’s Compensation Act and that his injury was not compensable. Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s decision. Affirmed.
BARNES, J., and CRONE, J., concur.
[The question here was whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing his tendered jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder.]Posted by Marcia Oddi at July 9, 2004 01:55 PMAguilar contends that his arguments and altercations with Michael, several hours before the murder, were sufficient provocation to engender passion. However, the record indicates that Aguilar returned to Michael’s apartment after their altercation in the bar, retrieved a knife from her kitchen, donned latex gloves, hid in her bathroom, waited several hours for her return, and stabbed her to death. This evidence does not support an inference that Aguilar acted under sudden heat. See Horan v. State, 682 N.E.2d 502, 507 (Ind. 1997) (holding that evidence was insufficient to support determination that defendant acted in sudden heat where sufficient time elapsed affording defendant time for cool reflection); see also Culver, 727 N.E.2d at 1071 (noting that establishing that defendant was angry does not, standing alone, show sudden heat; there must be evidence that someone provoked the defendant). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give Aguilar’s tendered instruction on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder. Affirmed.
BAKER, J., and BARNES, J., concur.