Sheila Ritchhart v. Indianapolis Public Schools (7/23/04 IndCtApp) [Torts]
Kirsch, Judge
Sheila Ritchhart appeals the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in her action against Indianapolis Public Schools (“IPS”) seeking damages for the negligent infliction of emotional distress and presents two issues for our review. We find the following restated issue dispositive:In Re The Matter of K.E. and W.E. (7/23/04 IndCtApp) [Family Law]
Do the designated materials establish that Ritchhart may not maintain an action for the negligent infliction of emotional distress where the undisputed facts show that IPS, which transported her young child to and from school, delivered the child to the wrong address, causing her not to know of his whereabouts for three hours? We affirm. * * *[W]e employ the three-part test set out in [Groves v. Taylor, 729 N.E.2d 569, 572-73 (Ind.2000)]. The second part of the test, that the plaintiff and the primary victim have a close family relationship, is obviously satisfied here. Joshua is the primary victim in this incident; Ritchhart is Joshua’s mother. This certainly constitutes a close family relationship. However, Ritchhart’s claim fails to satisfy either the first or the third parts of the test. Joshua was not physically injured. Moreover, Ritchhart did not witness any part of the incident giving rise to her complaint. Instead, this situation is more akin to that identified by the Groves court as the non-compensable “experience of learning of a loved one’s death or severe injury by indirect means.” Groves, 729 N.E.2d at 573 (quotations omitted). While Ritchhart certainly heard upsetting news regarding her son, first that he was lost, and then later, that he had been delivered to the wrong house, she did not personally witness an upsetting scene or its “gruesome aftermath.” Id. Under the Groves standard, Ritchhart may not recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress on these facts. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment. Affirmed.
RILEY, J., and ROBB, J., concur.
Christine Elliott appeals the denial of her motion to set aside a judgment terminating her parent-child relationship with her sons, K.E. and W.E. The sole issue on review is: Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying Elliott’s motion to set aside filed more than two years after judgment was entered? We affirm. * * *Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District v. David Marron (7/23/04 IndCtApp) [Procedure; Venue]Based on the foregoing, despite Elliott’s attempt to assert a belated appeal of the termination of her parental rights, our proper review is from the denial of a motion to set aside pursuant to T.R. 60(B). As Elliott’s two-year delay in challenging the July 2001 termination is not reasonable under the circumstances and she offered no meritorious claim or defense, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying her Motion to Set Aside. Judgment affirmed.
BAKER, J., and BAILEY, J., concur.
Appellant-Defendant Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District (“NICTD”) appeals, pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 14(A)(8), the denial of its motion to transfer venue of a Federal Employers Liability Act (“FELA”) claim filed by Appellee-Plaintiff David Marron (“Marron”) to Porter County, the county of its principal office. We reverse and remand. * * *State Farm Fire and Casulty Co. v. Chelsea Faver (7/23/04 IndCtApp) [Insurance]We, like the majority of courts that have considered the issue, find 45 U.S.C.A. § 56 to be inapplicable to venue determinations for FELA actions filed in state court. In essence, Marron chose to sue in Indiana, but seeks to establish preferred venue in Indiana by misplaced reliance upon a federal jurisdictional statute that has no application to venue when the claimant elects to proceed in state court. NICTD established that Porter County is a county of preferred venue under T.R. 75, while Lake County is not. As such, the trial court abused its discretion by denying NICTD’s motion for transfer. Accordingly, we remand this matter to the trial court to enter an order transferring this action to Porter County. Reversed and remanded .
BAKER, J., and FRIEDLANDER, J., concur.
[The issue is] whether C.F.’s injuries were caused by an “occurrence” and thus covered by the Christians’ homeowner’s insurance policy. * * *Posted by Marcia Oddi at July 23, 2004 02:08 PMIn the case at hand, State Farm attached to its motion for summary judgment the Chronological Case Summary in N.C.’s juvenile proceeding, which stated that N.C. admitted to two counts of criminal deviate conduct under Indiana Code section 35-42-4-2(3) and one count of child molesting under Indiana Code section 35-42-4-3(a). Criminal deviate conduct is defined as the following: “A person who knowingly or intentionally causes another person to perform or submit to deviate sexual conduct when . . . the other person is so mentally disabled or deficient that consent to the conduct cannot be given . . . .” Ind. Code § 35-42-4-2(a)(3) (emphasis added). Indiana Code section 35-42-4-3(a) defines child molesting as the following: “A person who, with a child under fourteen (14) years of age, performs or submits to sexual intercourse or deviate sexual conduct commits child molesting, a Class B felony.” Because N.C. admitted to knowingly or intentionally committing the acts against C.F., his actions were volitional and not accidental. Therefore, the Christians’ homeowner’s insurance policy did not provide coverage for C.F.’s injuries because they were not the result of an occurrence.
Conclusion. Because C.F.’s injuries did not arise from an occurrence, the Christians’ homeowner’s insurance policy did not provide coverage for C.F.’s injuries. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s denial of summary judgment and remand this case to the trial court to enter summary judgment in favor of State Farm. Reversed and remanded.
SULLIVAN, J. and RATLIFF, SrJ. concur.