James Childers v. State of Indiana (8/17/04 IndCtApp) [Criminal Law & Procedure]
Bailey, Judge
Appellant-Defendant James Childers (“Childers”) appeals his convictions of four counts of Check Fraud, Class D felonies, and one count of Attempted Theft, a Class D felony. We affirm.Ryan Beall v. Mooring Tax Asset Group (8/17/04 IndCtApp) [Attorney Malpractice]Issue. Childers presents for review three issues, which we have consolidated and restated as a single issue: whether there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions because the State failed to establish that: (a) Childers acted with intent to defraud Fifth Third Bank; (b) Fifth Third Bank is a “financial institution” as defined in the check fraud statute; or (c) Childers presented “checks.” * * *
In light of the foregoing, there is sufficient evidence to support Childers’ convictions of Check Fraud and Attempted Theft. Affirmed.
SHARPNACK, J., and MAY, J., concur.
Appellant, Ryan Beall, appeals from the judgment awarded against him in an attorney malpractice claim brought by Appellee, Mooring Tax Asset Group (“Mooring”). Beall presents four issues for our review, which we restate as: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that an attorney-client relationship existed between himself and Mooring; (2) whether certain tax sale notices sent on behalf of Mooring were legally defective; (3) whether Mooring properly established that its damages were caused by Beall’s negligence; and (4) whether the trial court properly denied Beall’s motion to correct error. * * *William Tate v. State of Indiana (8/17/04 IndCtApp) [Criminal Law & Procedure]
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
MAY, J., and VAIDIK, J., concur.
William Tate appeals from the sentence he received following his admission that he violated the conditions of his probation and his plea of guilty to a separate charge for operating a vehicle after being adjudged an habitual traffic offender, a Class D felony. He presents one issue for our review, whether the trial court erred in failing to credit the time he was incarcerated prior to sentencing against the sentence he received. We reverse and remand. * * *Posted by Marcia Oddi at August 17, 2004 02:08 PMGiven the clear mandate set forth in I.C. § 35-38-3-2 that the trial court must provide a copy of the judgment of conviction and sentence to the receiving authority and that it must include the amount of credit time earned for time spent in confinement before sentencing, in addition to case law which has consistently held that the pretrial credit must arise from pretrial confinement for the criminal charge for which the defendant is sentenced, we conclude that the trial court erred in failing to award Tate his credit time when he was sentenced. Thus, we remand to the trial court to revise the sentence so that Tate receives the credit time which he earned. In so doing, we recognize that we do not know whether any subsequent action has been taken in regard to the third charge which was pending at the time of Tate’s sentencing. If Tate has been sentenced upon that charge, it may very well be that the credit time was applied to that charge. If such is the case, the sentence upon that charge will have to be amended to reflect any changes made to the prior sentence so that Tate does not receive double credit, which was appropriately the trial court’s concern based upon Tate’s initial request to “save” the credit time.
We reverse, and the cause is remanded to the trial court to revise the sentence which Tate received to reflect that he is entitled to pretrial detention credit.
MAY, J., and VAIDIK, J., concur.