In the Matter of the Commitment of Martin Golub v. Dr. David Giles, M.D. and Gallahue Mental Health Services (9/15/04 IndCtApp) [ ]
Baker, Judge
Appellant-Respondent Martin Golub appeals an order involuntarily committing him to a mental health facility as an in-patient. Specifically, Golub argues that (1) appellees-petitioners Dr. David Giles, M.D. and Gallahue Mental Health Services (collectively, “Dr. Giles”) did not present sufficient evidence of a grave disability as defined by Indiana Code section 12-7-2-96 to satisfy the commitment requirements; and (2) the special conditions of the commitment prohibiting Golub from consuming alcohol and drugs and harassing or assaulting his family members were improperly imposed because they were not requested by Dr. Giles, and they bore no relationship to the reasons for Golub’s commitment.Jason Rhea v. State of Indiana (9/15/04 IndCtApp) [Criminal Law & Procedure]Finding that there was sufficient evidence of a grave disability, we affirm the order of commitment. We also find, however, that all of the special conditions were improperly imposed as they relate to Golub’s in-patient care and that the special conditions prohibiting Golub from consuming drugs and alcohol was also improperly imposed as it relates to Golub’s out-patient care. We therefore reverse that portion of the order and remand this cause to the trial court with instructions that it strike all special conditions from the order of commitment insofar as they apply to Golub’s in-patient care and to strike the special condition preventing Golub from consuming drugs and alcohol from the order of commitment altogether. * * *
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part with instructions to strike all special conditions from the order of commitment insofar as they apply to Golub’s in-patient care and to strike the special condition prohibiting Golub from consuming alcohol and drugs from the order of commitment altogether.
KIRSCH, C.J., and ROBB, J., concur
Following retrial, Jason K. Rhea appeals his conviction for conspiracy to commit robbery as a Class A felony. See footnote On appeal, he raises four issues for review, one of which we find dispositive: whether the trial court abused its discretion during Rhea’s second trial by admitting a transcript of testimony given by a witness at the first trial, after declaring that witness unavailable to testify. We reverse and remand. * * *Posted by Marcia Oddi at September 15, 2004 02:08 PMWhile the trial court pursued a novel approach to the thorny problem of Sadler’s refusal to testify, Sadler’s testimony was improperly admitted as a hearsay exception. As noted above, for prior testimony to be admitted under a hearsay exception, the testimony must have been given under oath at a prior judicial proceeding; the party against whom the testimony is offered had to have had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the prior proceeding; and the witness is unavailable at the time of the later proceeding. While Sadler was under oath at Rhea’s first trial, and found to be unavailable at his second, our court determined in Rhea’s first appeal that Rhea did not have a sufficient opportunity to cross-examine Sadler; therefore, Sadler’s testimony was not admissible at Rhea’s second trial.
We appreciate the balancing process the trial court undertook to try to preserve the rights of each party. Nevertheless we find it was error for the trial court to allow the transcript of Sadler’s testimony from Rhea’s first trial to be admitted at his second trial.
In the first appeal, our court concluded that, notwithstanding the error of the trial court, the State presented evidence that Rhea agreed with Sadler to commit the robbery sufficient to support the conspiracy conviction. Therefore, retrial with respect to the conspiracy charge is not barred. Reversed and remanded.
BAKER, J., and ROBB, J., concur.