Gale, Andrew v. Hyde Park Bank (ND Ill.)
Before BAUER, EASTERBROOK, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.Crull, Misti v. Sunderman, William (ND Ill.)
EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. In April 2002 Andrew Gale overdrew his checking account at Hyde Park Bank. He blamed the Bank, asserting that its delay in posting to his account a transaction in December 2001 with his debit card led him to think that the account contained a greater balance. He sued under the Electronic Funds Transfer Act, contending that the delay in posting the debit-card transaction violated 15 U.S.C. §1693h(a)(1), which requires banks to make electronic fund transfers in a “timely manner”. He also contended that the Bank had failed to provide him with information required by 15 U.S.C. §1693f. The district court dismissed the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.* * * Although the complaint did not cite these regulations, it did not have to. Complaints plead claims, not legal theories. See Bartholet v. Reishauer A.G. (Zürich), 953 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1992). All a complaint need do is narrate a claim for relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8; Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002). Gale’s complaint met this standard. He is entitled to judicial resolution of that grievance.
The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings on Gale’s claim under §1693f and the corresponding regulations.
Before BAUER, EASTERBROOK and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges.Posted by Marcia Oddi at September 17, 2004 12:22 PM
RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Misti Crull brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against her former employer, the State of Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board (“JIB”), individual JIB members and employees. She alleged constitutional violations as a result of the termination of her employment. The district court dismissed the JIB as a party because it was immune from suit in federal court. The parties then filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The remaining defendants asserted that summary judgment was appropriate because Ms. Crull had no property interest in her continued employment, and, therefore, they were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied both motions. The defendants appealed. We now reverse the judgment of the district court. * * *[p. 27] Conclusion. We find that Ms. Crull failed to demonstrate a property interest in her continued employment pursuant to any statute, regulation or contractual agreement, either express or from mutually explicit understandings. Accordingly, the defendants were entitled to summary judgment. The judgment of the district court is reversed.