Butler University v. Estate of George C. Verdak (9/23/04 IndCtApp) [Estates & Trusts]
Mathias, Judge
Liene Dindonis filed a petition to reopen the estate of George Verdak (“the estate”) in Marion Superior Court, Probate Division, which alleged that other property of the estate had been discovered. The probate court granted the petition and issued an order reopening the estate. Shortly thereafter, Butler University (“Butler”) filed objections to Dindonis’s petition. After a hearing was held on Butler’s objections, the probate court issued an order overruling Butler’s objections. Butler has filed this interlocutory appeal arguing that the probate court abused its discretion when it reopened the estate because Dindonis failed to prove that the property was subsequently discovered property of the estate. Dindonis cross-appeals and argues that Butler did not have standing to object and its appeal is untimely. * * *David A. Tebbe v. Conni M. Tebbe (9/23/04 IndCtApp) [Family Law]Accordingly, we conclude that the probate court did not abuse its discretion when it granted Dindonis’s petition to reopen the Verdak Estate under Indiana Code section 29-1-7.5-8 and overruled Butler’s objections. Moreover, we observe that our holding is consistent with our view that a prompt and orderly determination of the ownership of the Ballet Russe property at issue is of primary importance considering the circumstances presented. Once title is properly determined in probate court, claims in courts with ancillary jurisdiction will be resolved as well.
Conclusion. Butler is an interested party and had standing to object to Dindonis’s petition to reopen the Verdak Estate. Moreover, Butler’s appeal was timely. Finally, the probate court did not abuse its discretion when it granted Dindonis’s petition to reopen the Verdak Estate and overruled Butler’s objections. Affirmed.
BARNES, J., and CRONE, J., concur.
The marriage of David Tebbe (“David”) and Conni Tebbe (“Conni”) was dissolved in Allen Superior Court. David appeals, raising the following restated issues: [1] Whether the pass-through income of an S-corporation that does not increase a minority shareholder’s actual income should be included in the calculation of child support obligations; and, [2 Whether the trial court’s valuation of the Tebbe marital property was clearly erroneous.Posted by Marcia Oddi at September 23, 2004 03:05 PMConcluding the trial court’s valuation was proper but pass-through income should not be included when calculating David’s child support obligations, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. * * *
Conclusion. David’s pass-through income from TBI should not have been included in the calculation of his child support obligations. However, the valuation of David’s interest in TBI and the GMC van is supported by the record. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
DARDEN, J., and FRIEDLANDER, J., concur.