Yesterday afternoon we noted that the Court of Appeals had issued, as a Not for Publication opinion, the first Indiana appellate court decision applying Blakely v. Washington. We posted the scanned version. After some effort, we have extracted the text and can now present the ILB summary:
Baehl v. State (9/29/04 IndCtApp) [Criminal Law & Procedure - Not for Publication]
Sharpnack, Judge
Larry W. Baehl appeals his sentence for sexual misonduct with a minor as a class D felony. [Issue] [W]hether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing [Baehl]. We reverse and remand for resentencing. * * *Posted by Marcia Oddi at September 30, 2004 11:13 AMThe sole issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Baehl. Baehl argues that the aggravating factors used by the trial court were improper and that he should have been sentenced to no more than the presumptive sentence. Neither Baehl nor the State argue that the enhanced sentence violates the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), reh'g denied. Although we would not normally raise this issue sua sponte, we do so here because of the short duration of Baehl's sentence and the unusual circumstances of this case.[ft4]
In Blakely, the Supreme Court held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 2536 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,490, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000)). The Court defined the "statutory maximum" as "the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant." Id. at 2537 (emphasis in original). "In other words, the relevant 'statutory maximum' is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional fmdings." Id. (emphasis in original). Thus, in Blakely, the Court held that the defendant's sentence violated his Sixth Amendment's right to trial by jury because the trial court enhanced the sentence above the "statutory maximum" based upon the defendant's "deliberate cruelty," a fact that was not reflected in a jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. Id. at 2537-2538.
Our supreme court has not yet examined the viability of Indiana's sentencing scheme in light of Blakely. Indiana's current sentencing scheme allows a trial court to use aggravating circumstances to enhance a presumptive sentence if it: (1) identifies all significant mitigating and aggravating circumstances; (2) states the specific reason why each circumstance is determined to be mitigating or aggravating; and (3) articulates the court's evaluation and balancing of the circumstances. Crawford v. State, 770 N.E.2d 775,782 (Ind. 2002). The trial court enhanced Baehl's sentence beyond the one and one-half year presumptive sentence based upon two aggravating factors that were not reflected in the jury's verdict and were not admitted by Baehl. The enhancement of Baehl's sentence beyond the presumptive sentence for a class D felony violates the Supreme Court's holding in Blakely, 124 S. Ct. 2537-2538. Consequently, we reverse Baehl's sentence and remand for resentencing consistent with Blakley and Apprendi.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse Baehl's sentence and remand for resentencing. Reversed and remanded.
BAILEY, J. and MAY, J. concur
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[4] The United States Supreme Court recently noted that when one of its decisions "results in a 'new rule,' that rule applies to all criminal cases still pending on direct review." Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519 (2004) (quoting Griffith v. Kentuckv, 479 U.S. 314,328, 107 S. Ct. 708 (1987)) (holding that Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2000), which applied Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,490, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), to a death sentence imposed under Arizona's sentencing scheme, "announced a new procedural rule that does not apply retroactively to cases already final on direct review"). Baehl's appeal was pending on direct review at the time that the Supreme Court issued Blakely. Consequently, Blakely is applicable here.