Killinger, David v. Johnson, Don (CD Ill.)
Before FLAUM, Chief Judge, and COFFEY and KANNE, Circuit Judges.USA v. Jones, Philip D. (CD Ill.)
FLAUM, Chief Judge. Plaintiff-appellant David Killinger
owns a bar and restaurant in the Village of Port Byron,
Illinois. Because plaintiff’s establishment allegedly had sold
beer to an underage man, the mayor of Port Byron temporarily
closed the business, suspended Killinger’s license,
and imposed a fine. Killinger subsequently filed this suit in
federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the mayor and
the village, alleging violations of the Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of both defendants. We hold
that the mayor enjoys judicial immunity, and the alleged
injuries were not caused by a Port Byron policy. Accordingly,
we affirm. [Well worth reading in full.]
Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and WOOD, Circuit Judges.Hall, Thomas v. Babb, Steve (SD Ill.)
WOOD, Circuit Judge. Like many people who wind up as
defendants in criminal cases, Philip D. Jones’s problems
began when the police stopped his car for a traffic violation.
He was arrested after police discovered that he or his
passenger had tossed two bags from his car that turned out
to contain a substantial amount of cocaine. Jones was
charged and convicted of possession of more than 500 grams
of cocaine with intent to distribute. At the trial, Jones had
unsuccessfully sought to exclude evidence of two prior convictions. The correctness of this ruling is the only remaining
issue we must resolve in this appeal. Although we conclude
that the admission of this evidence was problematic, as it
seems to show only Jones’s propensity to commit drug
offenses, we nonetheless also find that on this record any
error was harmless. We therefore affirm the judgment
against him.
Before POSNER, ROVNER, and WOOD, Circuit Judges.Posted by Marcia Oddi at November 24, 2004 12:13 PM
WOOD, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Thomas Hall has brought
this suit on the basic premise (with which few would
disagree in the abstract) that political patronage is not yet
dead in Illinois. Hall was passed over for a new job within
the Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT) in 1999.
He believed that his lack of success could be traced to the
fact that the other applicant, while a fellow member of the
Republican Party, was somehow a more zealous Republican
than Hall. Hall sued the three state officials who had interviewed
him and made the decision to hire the other applicant under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his First
Amendment rights. The district court granted summary
judgment for the defendants. While we find the allegations
in Hall’s complaint to be troublesome, we conclude that Hall
did not present enough evidence to bolster those allegations
at the summary judgment stage. For that narrow reason,
we affirm the judgment of the district court. * * *It is well established that hiring, firing, or transferring
government employees based on political motivation violates
the First Amendment, with certain exceptions for policy
making positions and for employees having a confidential
relationship with a superior. See Rutan v. Republican Party
of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 65, 71 n.5 (1990); Elrod v. Burns, 427
U.S. 347, 367, 375 (1976). To make out a prima facie case
for this type of employment discrimination, a plaintiff must
show two things: first, that the plaintiff’s conduct was constitutionally
protected, and second, that the protected conduct
was a substantial or motivating factor in the employment
decision. Simmons v. Chi. Bd. of Educ., 289 F.3d 488, 495
(7th Cir. 2002); Nelms v. Modisett, 153 F.3d 815, 818 (7th
Cir. 1998); see also Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.
v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). It is not enough to show
only that the plaintiff was of a different political persuasion
than the decisionmakers or the successful applicant. See
Nelms, 153 F.3d at 818. If a plaintiff can make the prima
facie showing, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate
a legitimate, nonpolitical reason for the employment
decision. Simmons, 289 F.3d at 495; Nelms, 153 F.3d at 818. * * *Although Hall’s evidence comes up short in all the ways we
have discussed, there is one point made by the defendants
that requires comment. They assert that they should prevail
as a matter of law because Hall and Barger were affiliated
with the same political party. As we indicated earlier, this
goes too far. It fails to recognize that state workers in the
Rutan-protected group are entitled to be treated apolitically.
We see nothing to distinguish patronage based on a
relatively higher level of involvement within the same po-
litical party from patronage based more simply on membership
alone in a particular party. See Tomczak v. City of
Chi., 765 F.2d 633, 640 (7th Cir. 1985); Curinga v. City of
Clairton, 357 F.3d 305, 311 (3d Cir. 2004). Either one
coerces public employees to engage in political activity
regardless of their wishes.III. Although the circumstantial evidence on which Hall
wants to rely may raise some eyebrows about the hiring
practices used in his case, it is insufficient to create an issue
of material fact as to whether political motivation was
a substantial or motivating factor in the defendants’ decision
to hire Barger rather than Hall. Nothing he presented
was enough to overcome the uncontradicted evidence presented
by the defendants that a majority of the decisionmaking
body (that is, Piersma and Westell) did not even
know about the political backgrounds of Barger and Hall.
We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.