Nancy E. Prewitt v. State of Indiana (12/13/04 IndCtApp) [Criminal Law & Procedure]
Baker, Judge
This case illustrates what happens when the State engages in a pattern of withholding exculpatory and material evidence from a defendant prior to trial. Appellant-defendant Nancy Prewitt raises a number of alleged errors following her conviction for the Murder of her husband, William Davies. In particular, Prewitt claims that the following errors occurred: (1) the State improperly withheld certain exculpatory evidence from Prewitt in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (2) statistical evidence regarding the probability that Davies committed suicide was improperly admitted into evidence; (3) blood spatter evidence was erroneously admitted; (4) a statement from a purported expert witness indicating that Prewitt’s claim that she never heard a gunshot appeared suspicious was improperly admitted; (5) Davies’s father’s testimony that his son would never have committed suicide was improperly admitted; (6) an autopsy photograph depicting Davies’s cracked skull was erroneously admitted into evidence because it was prejudicial and prevented Prewitt from receiving a fair trial; (7) that the evidence was insufficient; and, finally, (8) that she was improperly sentenced.Northern Electric Company, Inc. v. Patrick Torma, Jr., et al (12/13/04 IndCtApp) [Trade Secrets]Concluding that the State improperly withheld material information from Prewitt prior to trial in violation of Brady, we reverse the judgment of the trial court on that basis. However, while we find that the evidence presented by the State was sufficient to support Prewitt’s conviction, we also observe that other issues raised by Prewitt in this appeal cause us great concern in the event of a retrial. Specifically, we note that the admission of certain statistics into evidence amounted to harmless error in these circumstances, that Prewitt has waived her argument with respect to the blood spatter evidence, and that Dr. Kohr’s testimony as to his difficulty in believing that Prewitt would not have heard the gunshot was not improperly admitted. We further observe that Davies’s father’s testimony was properly admitted and that the autopsy photograph was properly admitted. Finally, we conclude that the State’s evidence was sufficient to support Prewitt’s conviction so as not to bar a retrial under double jeopardy principles. * * *
Conclusion. In light of our discussion of the issues set forth above, we conclude that the State’s suppression and withholding of the Brady material from Prewitt before trial amounts to reversible error. We similarly note that Dr. Kohr’s testimony relating to the statistical probability that Davies committed suicide amounted—at most—to harmless error, that Prewitt has waived the argument that the testimony regarding blood spatter evidence was erroneously admitted and that Dr. Kohr properly testified that he had a difficult time believing that Prewitt would not have heard the gunshot under the circumstances. George Davies’s testimony was also properly admitted as to whether his son had the propensity to commit suicide, and the admission of the autopsy photograph into evidence was not error. Finally, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to support Prewitt’s conviction, thus allowing a retrial by the State.
Reversed and remanded.
FRIEDLANDER, J., and ROBB, J., concur
Statement of the Case. Appellant-Plaintiff, Northern Electric Company, Inc. (Northern Electric), appeals the trial court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in favor of Appellees-Defendants, Patrick L. Torma Jr. (Torma) and Hy-Tech Automation Repair, Inc. (Hy-Tech), with regard to Northern Electric’s Complaint, alleging a violation of the Indiana Trade Secret Act, statutory conversion, and breach of fiduciary duty. We reverse.Gregory Hall v. State of Indiana (12/13/04 IndCtApp) [Criminal Law & Procedure]Issues. Northern Electric raises seven issues on appeal, which we consolidate and restate into the following five issues:
Whether the trial court erred in concluding that an employee, assigned to repair servo motors, owns the data generated in the course of his duties and compiled in a useable format on his home computer;
Whether the trial court erred in determining that the compilation of data is not entitled to trade secret protection under the Indiana Uniform Trade Secret Act (IUTSA);
Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Torma did not commit statutory conversion within the meaning of the Victim’s Relief Act, Ind. Code § 34-24-3-1;
Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Torma did not breach his fiduciary duty to Northern Electric; and
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees pursuant to I.C. § 34-52-1-1 based on the finding that Northern Electric failed to reasonably protect its trade secrets. * * * Conclusion. Based on the foregoing, we find that the trial court erred as a matter of law by concluding that (1) Torma, assigned to repair servo motors by Northern Electric, owns the data generated in the course of his duties and compiled in a useable format on his home computer; (2) the compilation of data is not entitled to trade secret protection under IUTSA; (3) Torma did not commit criminal conversion within the meaning of the Victim’s Relief Act, Ind. Code § 34-24-3-1; (4) Torma did not breach his fiduciary duty to Northern Electric; and (5) Torma is entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to I.C. § 34-52-1-1. Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Reversed.
CRONE, J., and VAIDIK, J., concur.
Appellant, Gregory Charles Hall, challenges the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Upon appeal, Hall claims that the trial court erred in denying his petition because there is no record of his having been advised of his rights under Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). We reverse and remand. * * *Posted by Marcia Oddi at December 13, 2004 01:59 PMWe therefore conclude that Hall was not required to prove that he was not advised of his Boykin rights. Instead, given precedent and the definition of “collateral” as used in Parke, we conclude that a post-conviction petitioner need establish only that the record or transcript of the petitioner’s guilty plea hearings are unavailable and that reconstruction of the record via the Appellate Rules is impossible. Here, it is uncontested that the record of Hall’s guilty plea hearing is not in existence. The State argues, and the post-conviction court found, that reconstruction of Hall’s record was not impossible. We are unable to agree. * * *
We are not unaware of the implications of our holding. The current state of the case law would almost seem to encourage a defendant who pleaded guilty to wait several years after his plea hearing in hope that the transcript thereof will be destroyed or misplaced and that the participants’ memories will have faded. If so, he will be able to have his plea vacated and, if possible, be subject to a new trial. This, of course, could be avoided if the State pleaded and established the affirmative defense of laches—which for some reason was not done in the present case. We are also aware that Hall was sentenced in 1983 to a five-year suspended sentence with two years served on probation. It is therefore likely that the effect of our holding will be limited to some collateral result of Hall’s guilty plea and felony conviction, such as a subsequent habitual offender determination.
The judgment of the post-conviction court is reversed and the cause is remanded with instructions to grant the petition for post-conviction relief, i.e. vacation of Hall’s guilty plea.
VAIDIK, J., concurs.
MAY, J., dissents with separate opinion.
I would affirm the denial of Hall’s petition for post-conviction relief, and therefore I must respectfully dissent. * * *Reversal of Hall’s conviction on technical grounds at this late date comes at too high a cost to be justified simply by the absence of a transcript of his guilty plea hearing.