Larry Dorn v. State of Indiana (12/21/04 IndCtApp) [Criminal Law & Procedure]
Friedlander, Judge
Following a bench trial, Larry Dorn was convicted of Promoting Prostitution, a class C felony, Patronizing a Prostitute, a class A misdemeanor, and two counts of Intimidation, both as class D felonies. Dorn appeals only one of those convictions, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction of promoting prostitution. We affirm. * * *John Alvarado v. Sarah Nagy (12/21/04 IndCtApp) [Criminal Law & Procedure]
DARDEN, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.
John Alvarado, pro se, appeals the dismissal of the complaint he filed against Sarah Nagy, the attorney who represented him in an unsuccessful attempt to secure a modification of a sentence he was serving. The complaint was dismissed, upon Nagy’s motion, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We reverse. * * *In Re the Paternity of J.C. (12/21/04 IndCtApp) [Family Law]What sort of case is this, then? We conclude that Alvarado’s perhaps inartfully drafted complaint for damages states a claim for legal malpractice. We make this determination after evaluating the nature of the underlying substantive claim set out in the complaint. In so doing, we look beyond the labels used by Alvarado, and look instead to the substance and central character of the complaint, the rights and interests involved, and the relief demanded. See Morris v. Bank One, Indiana, N.A., 789 N.E.2d 68 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. Alvarado’s complaint alleges that Nagy signed a contract to represent him in seeking a sentence modification. Nagy did not accomplish that goal and Alvarado charges that he should not have to pay her fee. Obviously, he was dissatisfied with her performance under the contract and seeks return of the contractual fee. Any contract for work includes an implied duty to do the designated work skillfully, carefully, and in a workmanlike manner. INS Investigations Bureau, Inc. v. Lee, 784 N.E.2d 566 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. The failure to do so is an actionable tort, as well as a breach of contract. Id. As indicated above, punitive damages are not incompatible with a lawsuit to recover legal fees expended for allegedly flawed representation, and do not remove said lawsuit from the realm of legal malpractice into the real of attorney discipline.
Finally, we wish to emphasize that our conclusion that the trial court erred in granting Nagy’s motion to dismiss should not be interpreted as a comment upon the merits of Alvarado’s lawsuit. Indeed, the basis for Alvarado’s claim of substandard performance is threadbare at best. We hold only that the matter to be decided therein lies squarely within the jurisdiction of the Madison Circuit Court. Judgment reversed.
MATHIAS, J., and DARDEN, J., concur.
Appellant, Carson K. Carlisle Libbert (Mother), appeals the trial court’s Paternity Entry ordering the surname of the parties’ nonmarital child to be changed to that of Appellee, Michael L. VanWinkle (Father). We reverse and remand. * * *Kemper Insurance Companies v. Worker's Compensation Board (12/21/04 IndCtApp) [Worker's Compensation]Based on the foregoing, we reverse the trial court’s order changing the child’s surname and remand with instructions to the trial court to determine whether the name change is in the best interest of the child. Reversed and remanded.
CRONE, J., and VAIDIK, J., concur.
Appellant American Motorists Insurance Company, a member of the Kemper Insurance Companies (“Kemper”), appeals the order of the Worker’s Compensation Board (“the Board”) that Kemper is liable under its $3,000,000 surety bond (“the Bond”) for all the worker’s compensation liabilities of Bethlehem Steel Corporation (“Bethlehem”) arising from personal injury dates that occurred from August 1, 1979, to April 30, 2003. We affirm.Dwight D. Little v. State of Indiana (12/21/04 IndCtApp) [Criminal Law & Procedure]
VAIDIK, J., concurs.
BAKER, J., dissents with opinion.
* * * I am mindful of the clause providing that the Bond “shall be continuous in form and shall remain in full force and effect unless terminated in the manner hereinafter provided.” Appellant’s App. p. 121. Rather than requiring Kemper to cancel the contract to terminate it, however, the Bond provides two alternate methods of termination: “[t]his Bond shall be effective until September 1, 2001 or until cancelled.” Appellant’s App. p. 121-22 (emphasis added). Thus, the Bond remained in full force and effect unless terminated by date or by Kemper’s cancellation.
Based on what I believe to be the most sensible interpretation of the Bond language, Kemper should be liable for all worker’s compensation payments that were due during the effective period of the Bond. Although the effective period of the Bond was extended to September 1, 2002, there is no evidence that Bethlehem failed to make any worker’s compensation payments during that time period. Therefore, I would reverse the Board.
Little raises three issues on appeal, which we consolidate and restate as the following issue: whether Little received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. * * *One Dupont Centre, LLC, et al v. Dupont Auburn, LLC (12/21/04 IndCtApp) [Real Property]Based on the foregoing, we find that Little has failed to meet his burden of showing that the evidence is without conflict and leads unmistakably to a conclusion opposite that reached by the post-conviction court. Accordingly, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of Little’s Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. Affirmed.
CRONE, J., and VAIDIK, J., concur.
Dr. Ronald Cohen appeals the trial court’s denial of his complaint for a permanent injunction arising from a dispute with a neighboring landowner. Cohen purchased land adjacent to a pond to construct a professional building overlooking that pond. The seller explained that the adjacent land would be a common area perpetually. Several years later, the adjacent land was sold, and while the pond was retained, an office building was constructed on the land. Because we find no irrevocable license and that no restrictive covenants barred the development of the land, we affirm. * * *Posted by Marcia Oddi at December 21, 2004 02:11 PM
RILEY, J., and CRONE, J., concur.