J.R. v. State of Indiana (1/11/05 IndCtApp) [Juvenile Law]
Hoffman, Senior Judge
Respondent-Appellant J.R. appeals from the juvenile court’s true finding that he committed the delinquent act of receiving stolen property, a Class D felony if committed by an adult. Ind. Code §35-43-4-2(b). * * *Aberdeen Apartments, et al v. Cary Campbell Realty Alliance, Inc. (1/11/05 IndCtApp) [Trespass; Prior Restraint]The evidence that J.R. received stolen property is sufficient. * * * The juvenile court did not err in its determination that J.R. was a delinquent child for committing the act that would be receiving stolen property if committed by an adult because the evidence was sufficient. Affirmed.
CRONE, J., concurs.
BARNES, J., dissenting with separate opinion
Although I recognize that my view in this matter is not shared by a number of my colleagues, I believe that the statute, Indiana Code Section 31-37-10-2, requires a juvenile court to make an affirmative finding that the filing of the petition is in the best interests of the child. I understand the utility of the arguments advanced by others in M.B. and this case. I simply do not agree that we can or should “waive” a statutory condition precedent to jurisdiction. It is, I might add, not solely a “form over substance” argument that drives my concern.I adhere to the reasoning espoused in K.S. v. State, 807 N.E.2d 769 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d on rehearing, 816 N.E.2d 1164 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. pending. To the extent my colleagues in M.B. and this case have relied on opinions issued in civil matters outside of the juvenile delinquency context to conclude that the failure to approve the filing of a delinquency petition merely impacts jurisdiction over the case and is a waivable error, I believe it is inappropriate to do so. The cases that have specifically addressed juvenile delinquency petitions overwhelmingly indicate that express court approval for the filing of a delinquency petition is absolutely necessary and non-waivable. As an intermediate appellate court, I do not believe we are free to change the law in this area.
I also observe that a juvenile court is a different animal than a superior or circuit court with criminal jurisdiction. It fashions remedies and resolutions that are not, and should not be, available to those other entities. The presiding judge may very well exercise his or her discretion upon the filing of a juvenile petition and divert the child into a more informal adjustment situation, believe that a CHINS petition is a more appropriate path to follow, or do any number of things that are outside the scope of a formal juvenile charge.
I do not think it is either onerous or legally outrageous to require a presiding judge to review a juvenile petition and, in addition to the other statutory mandates, find that the filing of that petition is in the best interests of the child and to expressly note such finding on the record. I respectfully dissent and would reverse J.R.’s delinquency adjudication.
Aberdeen Apartments and ninety-five other apartment communities See footnote in Hamilton, Hancock, Hendricks, Johnson, Marion, and Shelby counties (collectively “the Apartments”), appeal the trial court’s denial of their motion for a preliminary injunction against Cary Campbell Realty Alliance, Inc. (“Campbell Realty”). We reverse and remand. * * *Save the Valley, Inc., Hoosier Environ. Council, Inc., and Citizens Action Coalition of Indiana v. Indiana-Kentucky Electric Corp. and Indiana Dept. of Environ. Mgmt. (1/11/05 IndCtApp) [Admiistrative law]Campbell Realty is an Indiana corporation with its principal office in Hamilton County. It is a for-profit business that seeks to sell new homes to first-time home buyers. In order to find new buyers, Campbell Realty publishes the Renter’s Gazette. The Renter’s Gazette is a free publication that Campbell Realty has distributed to numerous apartment communities throughout central Indiana for the last two to three years. In City of Indianapolis v. Campbell, 792 N.E.2d 620, 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), we held that the Renter’s Gazette qualified as a newspaper under a City of Indianapolis and Marion County ordinance. The Renter’s Gazette has the appearance of a newspaper. It is printed on newsprint and is folded down the middle. It is usually between eight and ten pages in length. The content of the Renter’s Gazette varies. It often contains articles that are appealing to renters, such as how to keep one’s apartment secure. It also usually contains the schedule of one of the local sports teams. Some of the articles in the Renter’s Gazette are designed to cast apartment communities, their management, and landlords in a negative light. * * *
Conclusion. The trial court abused its discretion in denying the Apartments’ motion for a preliminary injunction because landlords do have a sufficient possessory interest in the common areas of their properties to maintain an action for trespass to those areas and because the Apartments have presented sufficient evidence that they will suffer irreparable harm if a preliminary injunction is not granted. We also hold that the preliminary injunction sought by the Apartments will not constitute an impermissible prior restraint under either the First Amendment or Article I, Section 9 of the Indiana Constitution. The trial court’s denial of the Apartments’ motion for a preliminary injunction is therefore reversed, and we remand the case to the trial court. Reversed and remanded.
KIRSCH, C.J., concurs.
BAKER, J., dissents with opinion.
I understand that the Apartments find themselves in an aggravating situation—having to dedicate extra employee time to cleaning up the Renter’s Gazette from its properties, losing tenants who buy a home as a result of information contained in the Renter’s Gazette, and fearing a loss of prospective tenants who see the littered properties and choose not to rent an apartment. But I believe that granting the requested preliminary injunction gives landlords an unprecedented right to bar whomever they choose from their properties, and I also believe that the injunction violates Campbell Realty’s and the tenants’ rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Indiana Constitution. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. * * *
Save the Valley, Inc., Hoosier Environmental Counsel, Inc., and Citizens Action Coalition of Indiana, Inc., (collectively “Appellants”) appeal the denial of their motion to dismiss and the granting of a motion for partial summary judgment filed by Indiana-Kentucky Electric Corporation (“IKEC”). We reverse.Posted by Marcia Oddi at January 11, 2005 04:18 PMIssue. The Appellants raise three issues, which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court properly granted IKEC’s partial motion for summary judgment. * * *
As recognized by the Connecticut Supreme Court, associational standing advances two important objectives. First, allowing an association to represent its members’ interests promotes judicial economy and efficiency. The Hunt requirements allow a single plaintiff, in a single lawsuit, to adequately represent the interests of many members, avoiding repetitive and costly independent actions. Associational standing also allows members, who would have standing in their own right, to pool their financial resources and legal expertise to help ensure complete and vigorous litigation of the issues. A third reason for allowing associational standing was recognized by the Georgia Supreme Court when it observed that associations are generally less susceptible than individuals to retaliations by officials responsible for executing the challenged polices. * * *
The Appellants were not proceeding in their own right nor were they asserting that the public as a whole was harmed by the granting of the permit. See footnote Instead, the Appellants were proceeding on behalf of specific members who were individually aggrieved or adversely affected by IDEM’s decision. Because the Appellants were simply acting in a representational capacity on behalf of the members who were aggrieved or adversely affected by the granting of the permit, Indiana Code Section 4-21.5-3-7 is satisfied. In this context, the associations’ standing is based on its members possessing standing to seek administrative review in their own right. We see no reason why the Appellants should not be permitted to seek administrative review under the doctrine of associational standing.
In determining whether the Appellants satisfy the three requirements set out in Hunt, the parties do not appear to dispute that the named members are aggrieved or adversely affected by the granting of the petition. More specifically, however, the members named in the Appellants’ amended petition appear to have standing in their own right because they allege to be aggrieved or adversely affected by IDEM’s granting of the petition. “Aggrieved” has been defined as another person’s actions or a court’s decree or judgment adversely affecting someone’s personal, pecuniary, or property rights. “Aggrieved” has also been defined as a substantial grievance, including the denial of a personal or property right or the imposition of a burden or obligation on a party.
The petition alleged that members of the groups reside, work, and recreate in the area affected by the landfill and that the individual members would be adversely affected by the impact on the groundwater and by fugitive dust from the landfill. Second, because the Appellants aim to protect the environment and advance members’ interests on energy and utility issues, the interests they seek to protect are germane to the organizations’ purposes. Third, the Appellants only sought review of the granting of a permit and not an award of monetary damages, which would have required individualized proof. Thus, the three requirements of the Hunt test are satisfied.
Finally, based on our conclusion that the Appellants had standing to seek administrative review, we must also conclude that the trial court improperly denied their motion to dismiss IKEC’s petition for judicial review and complaint for declaratory judgment. Because the Appellants had standing, the OEA had jurisdiction over the case, requiring the Appellees to comply with the AOPA procedures for seeking judicial review.
Conclusion. The trial court improperly granted IKEC’s motion for partial summary judgment and also improperly denied the Appellants’ motions to dismiss. We reverse.
NAJAM, J., and SULLIVAN, J., concur.